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Corruption of Religion 





Government neutrality toward religion is based on 
familiar considerations:  the importance of avoiding 
religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and 
the danger that religious considerations will introduce a 
dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make 
democratic compromise more difficult.  This paper explores 
one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing, 
that is often overlooked:  the idea that religion can be 
corrupted by state involvement with it.  This idea is 
friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is 
determined to keep the state away from religion. 
If the religion-protective argument for 
disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot be 
adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with 
assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant 
Christianity.  Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a 
powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to 
keep its hands off religious doctrine.  It offers the best 
explanation for many otherwise mysterious rules of 
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 Laws, especially those with ambiguous language, are 
interpreted in light of their purposes.1  The Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, which states that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” 
is an example.  One of its core purposes was to prevent the 
corruption and degradation of religion that the framers 
associated with religious establishments.  The Clause, the 
Court has said, “stands as an expression of principle on 
the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion 
is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”2   This 
rationale has been neglected in modern Establishment Clause 
theory, but it can explain and justify the shape of our law 
better than the prevention of division along religious 
lines or of alienation, which are the themes that dominate 
contemporary thought about disestablishment. 
The corruption rationale has a problem, however.  It 
cannot be imported without modification into modern 
jurisprudence.  Any notion of “corruption,” “degradation,” 
or “perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which 
the degradation or perversion is a falling off.  That 
                                                 
1 This is a commonplace of statutory interpretation.  See 2A Norman J. 
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 
45:9 (7th ed. 2007). 
2 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting James Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.  As will be 
detailed below, this historical claim is accurate.  
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paradoxically raises establishment clause problems of its 
own. 
A claim that “we ought not to do A, because that is 
bad for B,” implies that (1) B is a good thing, and that 
(2) we can tell what is good and what is bad for B.  Thus, 
any invocation of the corruption rationale presupposes that 
religion is a good thing and that we can tell what is good 
and what is bad for religion.  For example, the framers’ 
understanding of the corruption rationale relied on 
Protestant or Deist understandings of what uncorrupted 
religion consisted in. No court today could embrace those 
understandings without engaging in precisely the kind of 
intervention in live theological controversy that the 
Clause was intended to forestall.  This difficulty has 
received almost no attention,3 but it poses a fundamental 
challenge to the coherence of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 
This Article will elucidate the difficulty and show 
how it can be answered.  The framers’ specific idea of the 
“religion” that must be protected from corruption has been 
supplanted by a different idea of religion, one which 
                                                 
3 The only extended treatment of the problem of which I am aware is John 
Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23 
(1949), discussed infra text accompanying notes 242-247.  It is noted 
in Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution:  Establishment and 
Fairness 493 (2008), and may explain the caution with which he deploys 
the corruption argument.   
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resists definition yet is quite clear in application.  
There is, in contemporary American culture, a proliferation 
of different understandings of the good of religion.  Yet 
despite this proliferation, we generally know religion when 
we see it.  Many people who are divided by these 
understandings converge on the idea that the object of 
their contestation will be damaged and degraded by state 
interference with it.  Thus clarified, the corruption 
rationale can explain many otherwise mysterious aspects of 
modern Establishment Clause law – notably, the peculiar 
rule, which has recently been formally stated for the first 
time, that older acknowledgements of ceremonial deism are 
probably constitutional, while newer ones will be 
invalidated.  It also offers a new justification for that 
law – one that is not really new, since it has been around 
for 350 years, but which has been obscured by the neo-
Rawlsian approach which is now so prominent in contemporary 
writing on religious liberty. 
Part I of this essay explores the gap in contemporary 
constitutional theory, and how the corruption argument can 
remedy it.  Part II examines the way in which the 
corruption argument depends on a claim that religion is, in 
some way, a good thing.  It also shows why this claim is 
hard to cognize from within the framework of neo-Rawlsian 
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political theory.  Part III describes the classic 
formulations of the claim, primarily by the founding 
generation.  Part IV enumerates the central claims of the 
corruption thesis, showing how those claims are closely 
tied to its religious roots, and thus apparently presenting 
an insuperable Establishment Clause obstacle to a court’s 
making those claims.  It also shows the failure of Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s attempt to resolve this difficulty.  Part 
V proposes a revision of the idea that separates it from 
its Protestant roots.  Part VI responds to objections 
(including Rawlsian ones) to that proposal.  Part VII shows 
how the reformulation offered here makes sense of the law. 
 
I.  The Gap in Establishment Clause Theory 
 
 Consider some familiar and well-settled rules of 
Establishment Clause law.  The state may not engage in 
speech that endorses a particular religion, or religion 
generally.4  It may not use a religious test for office.5  A 
law is invalid if it lacks a secular legislative purpose,6  
or if it purposefully discriminates against certain 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
5 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
6 See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), and 
cases discussed therein. 
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religious practices.7  Laws may not discriminate among 
religions.8   
A theme that runs through this area of the law is the 
state’s incompetence to decide matters that relate to the 
interpretation of religious practice or belief.  The state 
may not attempt to determine the “truth or falsity” of 
religious claims,9 courts may not try to resolve 
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice,”10 may 
not undertake “interpretation of particular church 
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the 
religion,”11 may make “no inquiry into religious doctrine,”12 
and may give “no consideration of doctrinal matters, 
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of 
faith.”13 
Yet at the same time, there is a broad range of 
official religious practices that are tolerated.  “In God 
We Trust” appears on the currency, legislative sessions 
begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with “God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” 
Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of 
                                                 
7 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
8 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
9 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
10 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
11 Id. at 450. 
12 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership 
v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
13 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  The boundaries of this permitted “ceremonial 
deism” are unclear.  Prayers in school are 
unconstitutional, but not a moment of silence.  The Court’s 
most recent set of decisions is particularly confusing, 
holding that an official Ten Commandments display is 
unconstitutional if it was erected recently, but not if it 
has been around for decades.14 
Any account of the Establishment Clause needs to 
explain these apparent inconsistencies.  One can write them 
off as unprincipled compromises, and many have.15  But it is 
possible to do better than that. 
The Establishment Clause has multiple purposes,16 so 
any argument about the basis of the Clause is going to be 
                                                 
14 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)(invalidating 
recently erected display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) 
(upholding 40-year-old display).  Justice Breyer, the only judge in the 
majority in both cases, relied on the divisiveness rationale in 
explaining his position.  See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer, 
J., concurring).  I will argue here that there are better grounds for 
his position than the ones he states. 
15 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
Religious Liberty:  Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 223-231 (2004); Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 86-87, 
95-102; Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly:  Van Orden, 
McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence, 5 First Amend. L. Rev. 59 (2006).  Some writers have 
suggested that the entire body of Establishment Clause law reflects 
this kind of unprincipled compromise.  See Noah Feldman, Divided By 
God:  America’s Church-State Problem – And What We Should Do About It 
216 (2005); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State:  
A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence (1995); Phillip 
Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 
72 Calif. L. Rev. 817 (1984). 
16 See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 6-13; Steven H. Shiffrin, The 
Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 9, 
34-54 (2004). 
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about what to emphasize.  Two accounts of the purposes of 
the Establishment Clause dominate contemporary theory.  One 
of these, whose leading proponent was Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, focuses on political division.  The other, 
principally articulated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
focuses on alienation.  Doubtless these concerns are among 
those that underlie the Establishment Clause.  But a theory 
that makes them central cannot explain or justify the 
specific rules of law described above. 
A.  The political division theory 
 
Burger argued that a state program could be 
unconstitutional because of its “divisive political 
potential.”17  This mattered because “political division 
along religious lines was one of the principal evils 
against which the First Amendment was intended to 
protect.”18  Such division constituted a “threat to the 
normal political process” and could “divert attention from 
the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of 
government.”19  The argument has often been invoked in 
                                                 
17 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 622, 623. 
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Supreme Court opinions, though it is unclear that it has 
done any analytical work in deciding cases.20 
The most fundamental defect with this argument, as a 
basis for any constitutional rule, is that political 
division is an unavoidable part of life in a democracy.  
This division will frequently take the form of religious 
division.21  It is not clear why division along religious 
lines is worse than religion along lines of race, gender, 
age, ethnicity, or economic class.22  As a standard for 
constitutionality, the division criterion is not 
administrable:  it is impossible for a court to predict 
which measures will cause political division.23  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause decisions 
themselves have been causes of political division; its 
decisions to invalidate prayer and Bible reading in the 
                                                 
20 For a thorough catalogue of examples, see Richard W. Garnett, 
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L. J. 1667 (2006).  
The argument has a large scholarly following.  See, e.g., Robert Audi, 
Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (2000); Douglas Laycock, 
Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313 (1996); Ira 
C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty:  A General Theory of the 
Religion Clauses, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 357 (1996); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195 (1992). 
21 Religious division has in fact been a basis for political division 
throughout American history.  See A. James Reichley, Religion in 
American Public Life (1985).  These divisions have remained manageable, 
not because of judicial intervention, but because the proliferation of 
religious factions has prevented any of them from gaining ascendancy.  
See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the 
Constitution of Religious Liberty:  A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 
37 Case W. L. Rev. 674 (1987). 
22 See generally Garnett, supra note 20. 
23 Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1278-84 (2d ed. 1988). 
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public schools have been very unpopular.  If the aim is to 
avoid division, then the law has been counterproductive. 
 
B.  The alienation theory 
 
A second theory, championed by Justice O’Connor, is 
concerned with preventing a certain kind of political 
alienation. “The Establishment Clause prohibits government 
from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to 
a person's standing in the political community.”24 
Government may not take action that endorses a particular 
religious view, because this “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”25  This criterion, O’Connor argues, is 
better able than any rival conception to “adequately 
protect the religious liberty [and] respect the religious 
diversity of the members of our pluralistic political 
community.”26   
                                                 
24 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)(O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
25 Id. at 688. 
26 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989)(O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  This argument also 
has a large scholarly following.  See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
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It is not clear, however, how endorsement either 
threatens religious liberty or fails to respect diversity.  
Endorsement as such is purely symbolic.  It does not 
restrict religious liberty in any tangible way.27  As for 
respect for diversity, several commentators have noted that 
it is not clear how endorsement is inconsistent with it. 
[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter 
so long as  "nonadherents" are in fact actually 
included in the political community. Under those 
circumstances, nonadherents who believe that they are 
excluded from the political community are merely 
expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has 
lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.28 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 61-62, 122 
(2007); Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. Va. 
L. Rev. 1 (2007); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality 
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1996).  Many writers draw 
on both arguments.  Thus, for example, Noah Feldman relies on the 
danger of political division to argue for an absolute rule against 
public funding for religious activities, while he relies on an 
alienation rationale for permitting government sponsored religious 
displays and prayers.  See Feldman, supra note 15, at 14-16.  He is 
aware that his proposals present their own dangers of division and 
alienation, but does not explain how he knows how to quantify the 
magnitudes on each side – how, for example, he knows that secularists’s 
“concerns over exclusion cannot effectively trump the sense of 
exclusion shared by the many Americans who want to express their 
religious values through politics.”  Id. at 16.   
27 See Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental 
Endorsement of Religion:  An Alternative to Current Establishment 
Clause Doctrine, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 53, 65 (1990). 
28 Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 701, 712 
(1986).  See also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 
Mich. L. Rev. 266, 307 (1987); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious 
and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to Professor 
Perry, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1067 (1991). 
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To ask that no one be alienated from the results of 
political decisionmaking is to ask too much.  In a 
pluralistic culture, alienation is inevitable.  “[S]ome 
beliefs must, but not all beliefs can, achieve recognition 
and ratification in the nation’s laws and public policies; 
and those whose positions are not so favored will sometimes 
feel like outsiders.”29  Once more, judicial intervention 
may simply make things worse.  Finally, the focus on 
alienation distorts the Establishment Clause, transforming 
it from a prescription about institutional arrangements 
into a kind of individual right, a right not to feel like 
an “outsider.”30 
 In short, both the division theory and the alienation 
suffer from the same defect.  The pathology each seeks to 
prevent is in fact not preventable.  Division and 
alienation will happen no matter what courts do.  It is not 
clear why these effects, however regrettable they may be, 
are worse when they are connected with religion. 
 More particularly, the Establishment Clause rules 
discussed above cannot prevent division and alienation.  On 
the contrary, they have sometimes exacerbated these 
problems.  Because division and alienation are so 
ubiquitous in politics, they do not provide a reason to 
                                                 
29 Smith, supra note 28, at 313. 
30 Id. at 300. 
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single out religion for special treatment:  why is this 
kind of division and alienation especially bad?  If these 
are the purposes that Establishment Clause law is supposed 
to serve, then the whole body of law is radically 
misconceived and should be abandoned. 
 
C.  The comparative strength of the corruption argument 
 
 The corruption argument can clear up these puzzles.  
It is not possible to prevent division and alienation.  But 
it is possible to keep government away from religion.  All 
the rules we considered at the beginning are well tailored 
to do that.  They all prevent government from deciding 
religious questions.  Even the sanctioning of ceremonial 
deism prevents government from deciding religious 
questions:  old ceremonies, which were broadly ecumenical 
at the time that they were enacted, are allowed to remain, 
but they are frozen in place.  No new theological decisions 
are allowed to be made. 
The idea that religion can be damaged and degraded by 
state involvement with it has nearly disappeared from 
contemporary Establishment Clause theory.  The neglect is 
apparent, for example, in Frederick Gedicks’s (in many ways 
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excellent and insightful) analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of religion.  Gedicks thinks that the Court is 
nominally committed to principles of secular individualism, 
which are suspicious of and hostile toward religion, while 
much of the country is devoted to a very different ethic, 
“religious communitarianism,” which permits the community 
to define itself and its goals in expressly religious 
terms, and which exerts a gravitational pressure of its own 
on constitutional interpretation.  Contemporary doctrine, 
Gedicks thinks, is an incoherent congeries of these 
incompatible elements.31  His work articulates widely shared 
assumptions about the character of contemporary 
controversies.32  However, he omits an important middle 
view, one that is friendly to religion but, precisely for 
that reason, is determined to keep the state away from 
religion.  It is associated with the most prominent early 
proponents of toleration and disestablishment, including 
Milton, Roger Williams, Locke, Pufendorf, Elisha Williams, 
Backus, Jefferson, Paine, Leland, and Madison. 
                                                 
31 See Gedicks, supra note 15. 
32 Noah Feldman draws a similar contrast, between the legal views of 
“legal secularists” and “values evangelicals.”  Feldman, supra note 15, 
at 6-8.  His omission of religiously based separatism from his 
diagnosis is noted in Perry Dane, Separation Anxiety, 22 J. L. & 
Religion 545 (2007), and Darryl Hart, A Secular Faith:  Why 
Christianity Favors the Separation of Church and State 14-15 (2006). 
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The omission of this view makes the controversy over 
the meaning of the establishment clause more polarizing 
than it needs to be.  If any interpretive question simply 
turns on a choice between secular individualism and 
religious communitarianism, then in any establishment 
clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the 
forces of progressivism and religious traditionalism – in 
other words, it is adjudicating the bitterest issues of 
theological controversy that divide American religion.33  
There is no middle ground between the two views, and 
compromise is impossible. 
The corruption argument is important, because it 
offers a way to reframe the rhetoric of the establishment 
clause in a way that could moderate these tensions and make 
it possible to find common ground. 
If the religion-protective argument for 
disestablishment is to be useful today, however, it cannot 
be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 
17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded 
with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of 
Protestant Christianity.  Nonetheless, suitably revised, it 
                                                 
33 See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion 218-22 
(1988); James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars:  The Struggle to Define 
America (1991). 
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provides a powerful reason for government, as a general 
matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine. 
 
II.  “Corruption” and the free exercise/establishment 
dilemma 
 
Charles Taylor observes that there are three different 
strategies by which modern political philosophy has tried 
to cope with religious diversity.  One, the “common ground 
strategy,” seeks to establish political ethics on the basis 
of premises shared across different confessional 
allegiances:  what all Christians, or even all theists, 
believe.34  The difficulty with this approach is that as 
pluralism grows, the common ground shrinks.  The universal 
sentiments of Christendom aren’t as universal as they once 
seemed.  A second understanding, the “independent political 
ethic” strategy, seeks to abstract away from all our 
disagreements to something that is independent of them.  
The aim is to infer, from certain fundamental preconditions 
of modern political life, conclusions about how political 
life should be organized.35  Pluralism has also created a 
                                                 
34 Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 33 
(Rajeev Bhargava, ed., 1998). 
35 Taylor observes that Grotius was an early explorer of this avenue:  
“We look for certain features of the human condition which allow us to 
deduce certain exceptionless norms, including those of peace and 
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problem for this approach:  we may want to ignore God only 
for political purposes, but if there are real live atheists 
in the society, then the state, by endorsing an ethic that 
is independent of religion, may appear to be taking their 
side on fundamental issues.  The difficulties of both of 
these approaches, Taylor thinks, create the case for 
“overlapping consensus,” which does not seek any agreement 
about foundations, but only acceptance of certain political 
principles. 
Taylor borrows the term “overlapping consensus” from 
John Rawls, but by it he means something considerably 
shallower, and therefore less necessarily commited to 
neutrality toward contested ideas of the good.  Taylor 
thinks that “Rawls still tries to hold on to too much of 
the older independent ethic.”36  Rawls expects citizens not 
only to endorse a set of political principles, but also to 
accept a doctrine of political constructivism and just 
terms of cooperation.  This, Taylor thinks, is too much to 
ask.  As a schedule of rights, political liberalism for 
Taylor may suggest an independent political ethic, but this 
ethic will inevitably be interpreted in light of any 
                                                                                                                                                 
political obedience.  Grotius would appear at times to be arguing 
almost more geometrico.”  Id. 
36 Id. at 51. 
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interpreter’s comprehensive view, and so will partake of 
the common ground strategy. 
 The regime of religious neutrality we actually have in 
the United States today resembles overlapping consensus as 
Taylor (but not Rawls) understands it.  The state is 
supposed to be neutral toward religion.  But at the same 
time, religion is treated as something so important that 
even political values are sometimes sacrificed for its 
sake.  This treatment of religion as a good is not a result 
that could be reached from within Rawlsian constructivism.37  
Neutrality in American law is based on a very abstract 
understanding of the common ground.  Because a Rawlsian 
approach excludes a common ground strategy, contemporary 
neo-Rawlsians have understandably had difficulty 
acknowledging the common ground elements of the present 
regime.38 
Federal law and the law of every state sometimes grant 
exemptions from laws, laws that presumably serve some valid 
purpose, when the laws place a burden on the free exercise 
                                                 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 360-371. 
38 Prominent among these are Martha Nussbaum, Christopher Eisgruber, and 
Lawrence Sager.  See Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience:  In 
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008); Eisgruber 
& Sager, supra note 26.  Both are critiqued in Andrew Koppelman, Is It 
Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571; 
Rawls and Nussbaum are further engaged infra text accompanying notes 
360-371.  
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of religion.39  This cannot be justified by a purely 
political ethic, which either would accommodate religion 
only when the power or stubbornness of the pertinent 
religious group makes that prudent, would purge politics of 
religion altogether because religion is irrational and 
dangerous, or would make religious ideas a tool of politics 
whenever that seemed convenient.40 
The accommodation of religion gives rise to a puzzle 
in First Amendment theory:  how to reconcile free exercise 
with establishment principles.  The Court has declared that 
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”41  The 
Establishment Clause “mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”42   But the Court has also acknowledged that 
“the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives 
special protection to the exercise of religion.”43  It is 
                                                 
39 For a survey of statutes and court decisions adopting the rule, see 
Laycock, supra note 15, at 211-12 & nn.368-73.  For a survey of 
situations in which the rule is applied, see 1 Kent Greenawalt, 
Religion and the Constitution:  Free Exercise and Fairness (2006). 
40 These were the positions taken by the purely political views that 
were held the time of the founding.  See John Witte, Jr., Religion and 
the American Constitutional Experiment 29-35 (2d ed. 2005). 
41  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
42 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968). 
43 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n one 
important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of 
 21
not logically possible for the government both to be 
neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give 
religion special protection.  Some justices and many 
commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as 
in tension with itself.44  Call this the free 
exercise/establishment dilemma. 
The solution to the dilemma, I have argued in earlier 
writings,45 is that the government is permitted to treat 
religion as a valuable thing, but only if “religion” is 
understood at such a high level of abstraction that the 
state is forbidden from endorsing any theological 
proposition, even the existence of God.  Accommodation is 
                                                                                                                                                 
religion:  Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims 
of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other 
strongly held beliefs do not.”). 
 The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that 
there is no right to religious exemptions from laws of general 
applicability. Even after Smith, however, religions retain some special 
protection that nonreligious beliefs do not share. In Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court 
struck down four ordinances that a city had enacted with the avowed 
purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal 
sacrifice. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment because their object was the suppression of a 
religious practice. Id. at 542, 547. The result would have been 
different if the law had targeted a club that did exactly what the 
Santeria did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its 
members thought that killing animals was fun. 
44 As the Court put it recently, “the two Clauses . . . often exert 
conflicting pressures.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
45 Koppelman, supra note 38; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious 
Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003); 
Koppelman, supra note 6; Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, 
Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, On 
the Moral Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777 (2001); 
and Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 393 (1999). 
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permissible so long as government does not discriminate, in 
its accommodations, between theistic and nontheistic 
religions.  I will discuss this argument in more detail in 
the conclusion.  This paper will argue that the explanatory 
power of the corruption argument is further evidence that 
my account is correct. 
 The corruption argument, I have already noted, rests 
on a core assumption that religion is valuable and that 
neutrality exists in order to protect it.  This is apparent 
in the Court’s most extensive statement of the corruption 
argument.  In a decision invalidating a state’s imposition 
of a nonsectarian, state-composed prayer to be read in 
public schools, the Court explained: 
[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the 
Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a 
union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion. The history of 
governmentally established religion, both in England 
and in this country, showed that whenever government 
had allied itself with one particular form of 
religion, the inevitable result had been that it had 
incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of 
those who held contrary beliefs. That same history 
showed that many people had lost their respect for any 
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religion that had relied upon the support for 
government to spread its faith. The Establishment 
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on 
the part of the Founders of our Constitution that 
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to 
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil 
magistrate.46 
The Court makes two arguments here.  The first is a 
contingent sociological claim, that establishment tends to 
produce negative attitudes toward the “particular form” of 
religion that is established.  The second runs much deeper.  
In the final sentence, the Court claims that there is 
something fundamentally impious about establishment.  It 
breaches the “sacred” and the “holy.”  It is remarkable to 
find such prophetic language in the U.S. Reports, but it 
has appeared there repeatedly,47 especially in opinions 
                                                 
46 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. 
47 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992)(Blackmun, J., 
concurring)(“The favored religion may be compromised as political 
figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may 
be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.”); 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989)(Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(“The government-sponsored 
display of the menorah alongside a Christmas tree also works a 
distortion of the Jewish religious calendar. . . . the city's erection 
alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish 
religious holiday . . . has the effect of promoting a Christianized 
version of Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 
(1988)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(“The First Amendment protects not only 
the State from being captured by the Church, but also protects the 
Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for its 
purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985)(Brennan, 
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written by Justice Hugo Black, the principal architect of 
modern Establishment Clause theory.48 
 The most prominent contemporary proponent of this view 
is Justice David Souter.  In four dissenting opinions, two 
of which were signed by one vote short of a majority of the 
Justices, and one concurrence, he has invoked the 
corruption argument as a reason for maintaining a strict 
rule that the state may not provide aid to religion in any 
form, even in a neutral program that does not aid religion 
as such.49  I will examine Souter’s arguments in Part V.  
                                                                                                                                                 
J.)(“When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in 
matters of religious significance . . . the freedom of even the 
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion 
into sacred matters.”); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 385 (1985)(Brennan, J.)(favored religions may be “taint[ed] . . . 
with a corrosive secularism.”); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(noting “the 
pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to 
compromise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it.”); 
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963)(Brennan, J., 
concurring)(“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of 
sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as 
high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a 
creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the 
government.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)(“we have staked the very existence of our 
country on the faith that complete separation between the state and 
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”). 
48 See infra text accompanying notes 216-247. 
49 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002)(Souter, J., 
joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(Establishment 
Clause aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the 
specific threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to educate 
the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of 
their faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871-72 (2000)(Souter, 
J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“government aid 
corrupts religion”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 
(1997)(Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and 
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“religions supported by governments are 
compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is 
burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Univ. 
 25
 
III.  The classic formulations of the claim 
 
As noted earlier, any notion of “corruption” or 
“perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which the 
corruption or perversion is a falling off.50  A claim that 
“we ought not to do A, because that is bad for B,” implies 
that (1) B is a good thing, and that (2) we can tell what 
is good and what is bad for B.  Thus, the Court’s claim 
presents, in a different form than accommodation, the same 
problem:  it presupposes that religion is a good thing and 
that we can tell what is good and what is bad for religion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995)(Souter, J., joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(“the Establishment Clause . . . 
was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the 
destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to 
protect religion from a corrupting dependence on support from the 
Government”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 615 (1992)(Souter, J., 
joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring)(quoting with approval 
Madison’s statement that “religion & Govt. will both exist in greater 
purity, the less they are mixed together.” Letter from J. Madison to E. 
Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders' Constitution, at 105, 
106); id. at 627 (quoting the same passage again, and citing the 
importance of “protecting religion from the demeaning effects of any 
governmental embrace.”).  Perhaps one should also count his dissent in 
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007), which 
quotes with approval Justice Black’s statement that the framers thought 
“individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government 
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to 
assist any or all religions.”  Id. at 2588 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting), quoting Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). 
50 Vincent Blasi has noted that ideas of corruption or distortion of 
religion “are meaningless in the absence of a baseline.”  School 
Vouchers and Religious Liberty:  Seven Questions from Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 798 (2002). 
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 These claims made perfect sense at the time of the 
founding.  They played a large role in the movement toward 
disestablishment.  But they depend on contestable 
theological claims. 
 The claim’s basis is at least as ancient as Jesus 
Christ’s insistence on distinguishing the things that are 
Caesar’s from the things that are God’s.51  It was pervasive 
during the period of the founding.  Here I will focus on 
its leading expositors, but variations on the claim appear 
in much popular rhetoric of the time.52 
 
A.  Precursors 
 
 The generation that enacted the Establishment Clause 
did not invent the corruption argument.  It had been around 
for over a century.  Here we consider the most prominent 
early statements of the argument. 
                                                 
51 Mark 12:17; Matthew 22:21; Luke 20:25.  Other early Christian 
formulations of the separation claim are briefly described in John 
Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1869, 
1876-86 (2003), and Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 
21-38 (2002).  For earlier English and American Protestant 
formulations, see Thomas G. Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and 
State:  Historical Backgrounds and Approaches for the Future 184-202 
(1965). 
52 For examples, see Hamburger, supra note 51, at 5 n.7, 55, 74-75, 121-
22, 124, 170-71; Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause:  Religion 
and the First Amendment 64-67, 124 (1986; 2d ed. 1994); Thomas J. 
Curry, The First Freedoms:  Church and State in America to the Passage 
of the First Amendment 130, 144, 156, 168 (1986). 
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i.  John Milton 
 
 The corruption argument against establishment emerged 
roughly simultaneously in England and America.  We will 
begin with Milton, because he was writing against 
establishment in its classic form.  The central elements of 
the English religious establishment were government control 
over the doctrines, structure, and liturgy of the state 
church; mandatory attendance at the religious worship 
services of the state church; public financial support of 
the state church; prohibition of religious worship in other 
denominations; the use of the state church for civil 
functions; and the limitation of political participation to 
members of the state church.53  There was also a restriction 
of the dissemination of heretical doctrines by means, inter 
alia, of licensing of the press:  it was illegal to publish 
anything without prior permission of the Crown. 
 Milton was opposed to all of these, but attacked 
different strands of the Establishment in different 
writings.  In Areopagitica, Milton argued for the 
abandonment of licensing.  This, he admitted, would allow 
                                                 
53 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the 
Founding, Part I:  Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
2105 (2003). 
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the proliferation of heretical religious doctrines, and so 
undermine the established church’s monopoly over religious 
opinion. 
Milton insisted that even correct religious doctrine 
would not bring about salvation if it was the consequence 
of blind conformity rather than active engagement with 
religious questions.  “A man may be a heretic in the truth; 
and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, 
or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other 
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he 
holds becomes his heresy.”54  Religious salvation was to be 
achieved only by struggle against temptation.  “Assuredly 
we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity 
much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is 
by what is contrary.”55  It follows that “all opinions, yea 
errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and 
assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is 
truest.”56 
                                                 
54 John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in Complete Poems and Major Prose 
739 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed. 1957). 
55 Id. at 728. 
56 Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is 
likewise emphasized in Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 102ff, in 
Collected Poems and Major Prose at 260.  The speaker here is God the 
Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and, 
later, Adam to transgress: 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.  
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere  
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,  
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d,  
 29
The truth did not need state assistance to prevail:  
“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to 
play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do 
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her 
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew 
Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.”57  
The state, moreover, is likely to err in deciding what 
ideas to restrict:  “if it come to prohibiting, there is 
not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself; 
whose first appearance to our eyes bleared and dimmed with 
prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unplausible 
than many errors.”58  Even if errors can be prevented by 
coercion, “God sure esteems the growth and completing of 
one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten 
vicious.”59 
What matters is not outward conformity, but adherence 
to the inner light.  All that coercion can produce is “the 
forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly 
divided minds.”60  On the other hand, the pluralism that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Not what they would? what praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,  
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,  
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity,  
Not mee. 
57 Areopagitica at 746. 
58 Id. at 748. 
59 Id. at 753. 
60 Id. at 742. 
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toleration would produce is not a bad thing; “those 
neighboring differences, or rather indifferences . . . 
whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline . . . 
though they be many, need not interrupt ‘the unity of 
spirit,’ if we could but find among us the ‘bond of 
peace.’”61 
 Christopher Hill observes that Milton’s theology rests 
on a radical Arminianism, in which salvation is available 
to all men who believe, and is in no way dependent on the 
formal ceremonies of Catholicism or of the Anglican 
Church.62  In sacraments as Milton understands them, “it is 
the attitude of the recipient that matters, not the 
ceremony.”63  This radical individualism was connected with 
a range of heretical religious views, many of them 
                                                 
61 Id. at 747-48.  See also Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 183ff., in 
Collected Poems and Major Prose at 262-63, where the “sincere intent” 
of prayer is a lot more important than its content: 
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace, 
Elect above the rest; so is my will: 
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warn'd 
Thir sinful state, and to appease betimes 
Th’ incensed Deity while offer'd grace 
Invites; for I will clear thir senses dark, 
What may suffice, and soft’n stony hearts 
To pray, repent, and bring obedience due. 
To Prayer, repentance, and obedience due, 
Though but endeavor'd with sincere intent, 
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut. 
And I will place within them as a guide, 
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear, 
Light after light well us'd they shall attain, 
And to the end persisting, safe arrive. 
62 Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution 268-78 (1977). 
63 Id. at 306. 
 31
idiosyncratic to Milton.64  Prominent among these was the 
priesthood of all believers: anyone with a gift for making 
the Word of God known should be free to disseminate it.65  
Milton’s defense of free speech depended crucially on his 
religious views.66  Given Milton’s individualism, there was 
little of value left for a state-sponsored church to do. 
 Thus Milton opposed any state funding for the support 
of ministers.  The desire for state support, Milton argued, 
reflected “covetousness and unjust claim to other men’s 
goods; a contention foul and odious in any man, but most of 
all in ministers of the gospel.”67  State-mandated tithes 
for the established clergy “give men just cause to suspect 
that they came neither called nor sent from above to preach 
the word, but from below, by the instinct of their own 
hunger, to feed upon the church.”68  The clergy’s claim to a 
share of each person’s earnings, Milton observed, had led 
to “their seizing of pots and pans from the poor, who have 
as good right to tithes as they; from some, the very beds,” 
                                                 
64 See generally id. at 233-337.  His religious views rested on a 
reading of Biblical authority which was equally idiosyncratic.  See 
Regina M. Schwartz, Milton on the Bible, in A Companion to Milton 
(Thomas N. Corns ed., 2001). 
65 See William Haller, Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution 
56-64 (1955). 
66 See Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First 
Amendment, Yale Law School Occasional Papers (1995), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/6 (visited June 18, 2008). 
67 John Milton, Considerations Touching the Likeliest Means to Remove 
Hirelings Out of the Church (1659), in Collected Poems and Major Prose 
at 857. 
68 Id. at 870. 
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from which “it may be feared that many will as much abhor 
the gospel, if such violence as this be suffered in her 
ministers, and in that which they also pretend to be the 
offering of the Lord.”69  Such support was fundamentally 
unChristian, because  
the Christian church is universal; not tied to nation, 
diocese, or parish, but consisting of many particular 
churches complete in themselves, gathered not by 
compulsion or the accident of dwelling nigh together, 
but by free consent, choosing both their particular 
church and their church officers.  Whereas if tithes 
be set up, all these Christian privileges will be 
disturbed and soon lost, and with them Christian 
liberty.70 
State support likewise elevates the civil power over 
God, subjecting the church to the “political drifts or 
conceived opinions”71 of the civil ruler, and thus “upon her 
whose only head is in heaven, yea, upon him who is her only 
head, sets another in effect, and, which is most monstrous, 
                                                 
69 Id. at 866. 
70 Id. at 865. 
71 Id. at 872.  Cf. id. at 878:  “For magistrates . . . will pay none 
but such whom by their committees of examination they find conformable 
to their interests and opinions: and hirelings will soon frame 
themselves to that interest and those opinions which they see best 
pleasing to their paymasters; and to seem right themselves, will force 
others as to the truth.” 
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a human on a heavenly, a carnal on a spiritual, a political 
head on an ecclesiastical body.”72 
Some authorities have suggested that state support of 
religious should not be deemed to violate the establishment 
clause unless someone is coerced to support a religion with 
which they disagree.73  Certain versions of the corruption 
argument, we shall see, condemn only coercive 
establishments, while others reach any state support for 
religion.  Milton falls into the latter category.  He never 
seems to have considered the possibility of a noncoercive 
establishment, but the argument just quoted reaches such an 
establishment as well.  Any state influence over religion 
of any kind is a usurpation. 
 
ii.  Roger Williams 
 
In the Americas, the germinal formulation of the 
corruption argument is that of Milton’s friend Roger 
Williams, who invented the modern, religiously tolerant 
state when he founded Rhode Island in 1635.  Williams also 
                                                 
72 Id. at 872. 
73 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005)(Thomas, J., 
concurring); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of 
Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933 (1986).  For critique of 
claims that this was the original meaning of the establishment clause, 
see Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion:  Another False 
Theory About the Establishment Clause, 26 Val. L. Rev. 37 (1991). 
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was one of the first to use the metaphor of the wall of 
separation between church and state, and his overriding 
concern was that, absent such a wall, the church would be 
corrupted by the world.  Williams’s religious views are 
deeply alien to modern sensibilities.  He was no secular 
individualist.  Timothy Hall observes that Williams was “a 
religious fanatic” who “did not champion a proto-ecumenism 
and was not the sort of person likely to attend an 
interfaith community worship service.”74  Williams’s 
weirdness shows how broad the range of views is that can 
join in an overlapping consensus.75  Common ground can be 
found even between modern liberals and the likes of 
Williams. 
 Williams’s political views grew out of his religious 
ideas.76  Williams was a part of the Separatist movement, 
which held that only those who had personally received 
God’s grace could partake in the sacrament of communion.  
The Puritans who believed this eventually concluded that 
                                                 
74 Timothy L. Hall, Separating Church and State:  Roger Williams and 
Religious Liberty 18, 6 (1998).    
75 Hall notes this and uses the term on pp. 8-10, 147, and 165.  The 
parallel between Williams and Rawls is developed at much greater length 
in Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 34-71.  See also the exposition of 
Williams’s political philosophy in Edmund S. Morgan, Roger Williams:  
The Church and the State 115-26 (1967). 
76 Nussbaum claims that Williams “nowhere alludes to these beliefs in 
arguing for liberty of conscience – nor should he, since it is his 
considered position that political principles should not be based on 
sectarian religious views of any sort.”  Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 
43.  This is true of some of Williams’s arguments.  It is not, however, 
true of his argument that establishment corrupts religion. 
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they had to leave the Church of England, which ministered 
to saints and sinners alike, and form new, separate 
churches.77  Williams accepted this argument, and eventually 
radicalized it by holding that the Separatist churches of 
New England were unregenerate as long as they did not 
publicly repent for ever having had anything to do with the 
Anglican church.  Even regenerate persons, such as Martin 
Luther or the martyrs burned by Queen Mary, were 
unqualified for church membership until they repented their 
past associations with corrupted churches, whether Catholic 
or Anglican.78  Similar logic led him to hold that a man 
should not pray with his wife unless both were regenerate. 
 The Puritans departed from English establishment by 
separating religious from political authority.  No 
clergyman held any public office in early Massachusetts.79  
However, the state was responsible for the spiritual 
welfare of its citizens, and heresy was a punishable 
offense; Williams himself was exiled for his heretical 
views.80  Ministers were supported by taxes, and voting and 
public office were restricted to church members.81 
                                                 
77 Morgan, supra note 75, at 11-17. 
78 Id. at 37. 
79 Id. at 70. 
80 Id. at 71. 
81 Id. at 74-76. 
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 Williams condemned all this.  Religious activity, 
Williams thought, was worthless unless it was sincere:  
“what ever Worship, Ministry, Ministration, the best and 
purest are practiced without faith and true perswasion that 
they are the true institutions of God, they are sin . . .”82  
Authenticity of belief was, on the contrary, the central 
requirement for salvation.  If one held that some points of 
doctrine were so fundamental that salvation is impossible 
without believing them, 
I should everlastingly condemn thousands, and ten 
thousands, yea the whole generation of the righteous, 
who since the falling away (from the first primitive 
Christian state or worship) have and doe erre 
fundamentally concerning the true matter, 
constitution, gathering and governing of the Church:  
and yet farre be it from a pious breast to imagine 
that they are not saved, and that their soules are not 
bound up in the bundle of eternall life.83 
 State coercion to participate in religious services 
was sinful for everyone present:  it corrupted the service 
                                                 
82 Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for cause of 
Conscience, discussed, in A Conference betweene Truth and Peace, in 3 
The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 12 (1963). 
83 Id. at 64.  On the other hand, Williams evidently presupposes in this 
passage that he is only talking about Christians.  He does not suggest 
that people exposed to the Christian message who rejected it in favor 
of a competing nonChristian view could be saved.  Thanks to Kent 
Greenawalt for pressing me on this point. 
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by introducing the presence of sinners, and it lulled the 
sinners into a false sense of security, hiding from them 
their awful condition.84  Moreover, no human being had the 
power to start churches – that right was reserved to God – 
and so the people could not delegate to the state an 
authority to control religion that they did not themselves 
possess.85  To subject religion to temporal power was thus 
“to pull God and Christ, and Spirit out of Heaven, and 
subject them unto naturall, sinfull, inconstant men, and so 
consequently to Sathan himselfe, by whom all peoples 
naturally are guided.”86  
 Williams’s defense of freedom of conscience was 
crucially dependent on his ideas about the incompetence of 
government in religious matters.  He did not value freedom 
for its own sake.  For Williams, Perry Miller observes, 
“freedom was something negative, which protects men from 
worldly compulsions in a world where any compulsion, most 
of all one to virtue, increases the quantity of sin.  
Liberty was a way of not adding to the stock of human 
depravity; were men not sinful, there would be no need of 
freedom.”87  In nonreligious matters of morality that (he 
                                                 
84 Morgan, supra note 75, at 32, 139. 
85 Id. at 89. 
86 Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, supra note 82, at 250. 
87 Perry Miller, Roger Williams:  His Contribution to the American 
Tradition 29 (1962). 
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thought) affected the public safety, in which he included 
quarreling, disobedience, prostitution, uncleanliness, and 
lasciviousness, the state could legitimately coerce even 
those who were motivated by religion.88  Williams did not 
favor religious exemptions as such, though he did worry 
that government’s claim to be pursuing legitimate public 
interests might sometimes be a mask for religious 
persecution.89  Conscience should be respected, not because 
it was less likely to err in religious matters, but rather 
because the conscientious search for religious truth was 
the only possible path to salvation.  Although only a few 
people could be saved, conscience alone could bring even 
this small number to God. 
 A consequence of disestablishment that troubled most 
of Williams’s contemporaries was that voluntary 
contributions might not be enough to support churches.  
This did not bother Williams, because he thought that only 
false churches existed in the world, and that therefore the 
world would be no worse if they all disappeared.90  It 
followed from Williams’s radical individualism that any 
religious institution at all was a corruption of 
                                                 
88 Morgan, supra note 75, at 126-135; but see Nussbaum, supra note 38, 
at 49-51. 
89 Hall, supra note 74, at 103-11, 120-1. 
90 William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and 
State in America, 73 Am. Hist. Rev. 1392, 1408 (1968). 
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Christianity.  The worthlessness of any state-sponsored 
church was a corollary. 
 If you don’t accept the theological premises of 
Separatism, then Williams’s arguments about corruption 
won’t move you at all.  But it was by way of his Separatism 
that he arrived at a view of the proper role of government 
that bracketed religious controversy from public life. 
 Because Williams’s theological views are so 
pessimistic and intolerant, he is a wonderful 
counterexample to Rousseau’s dictum that "it is impossible 
to live at peace with those whom one believes to be 
damned."91  It’s hard to find another American thinker who 
was as convinced as Williams that his neighbors were headed 
for the inferno.92 
                                                 
91 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 4, ch. 8. 
92 Mark DeWolfe Howe’s The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and 
Government in American Constitutional History (1965) appropriates 
Williams in a strange way.  Howe, throughout the book, draws a contrast 
much like that of Gedicks, contrasting the Jeffersonian, secularist 
view of separation, which he disfavors, with that of Williams, who 
feared “the worldly corruptions which might consume the churches if 
sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained.” Id. at 6.  
He takes as evidence that the Williams view better represents our 
traditions what he calls the “de facto establishment,” which embraces 
“a host of favoring tributes to faith” such as Sunday closing laws, the 
use of God on the currency, legislative prayers, Thanksgiving 
proclamations, and so forth.  Id. at 11.  He uses the term because 
“this social reality, in its technical independence from law, bears 
legally some analogy to that ugly actuality known as de facto 
segregation.”  Id. 
 This gives rise to several puzzles.  What Howe describes isn’t de 
facto at all, but de jure.  De facto segregation is segregation in 
which the state does not officially give recognition to race at all, or 
even silently but intentionally take race into account.  What Howe 
calls de facto establishment is a set of practices in which the state 
behaves in overtly religious ways, and proclaims religious truth.  
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iii.  John Locke 
 
 The idea that state authority over religion can 
corrupt religion is likewise emphasized in John Locke’s 
Letter Concerning Toleration.  The central target of the 
Letter is the forcible repression of those who dissented 
from the doctrines of the Anglican church.  The punishment 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Ceremonial deism” would be a better term for these practices.  (In 
fact, the Court has never used “de facto establishment,” but there have 
been a few references to “ceremonial deism” in the opinions.)  When 
Justice Brennan introduced that term, he wrote:   
such practices as the designation of “In God We Trust” as our 
national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge 
of Allegiance can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt 
phrase, as a form of “ceremonial deism,” protected from 
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost 
through rote repetition any significant religious content. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 Perhaps ceremonial deism can be justified.  But Williams would be 
a strange authority to invoke on its behalf.  Williams’ suspicion of 
state control over religion would appear logically to extend to any 
degree of ceremonial support for religion.  The draining of religious 
meaning through rote repetition is just the kind of degradation of 
religion that Williams was afraid of.  That’s why Rhode Island didn’t 
have an established church.  If the state is incompetent to adjudicate 
religious matters, then why should it be authorized to declare that 
there is one God, and that the Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are 
mistaken about this question?  This question never occurs to Howe.  One 
can imagine what Williams would have thought of the modern Christmas 
display, paid for by tax dollars secured through the influence of the 
local merchants’ association, reminding us that Christ suffered and 
died on the cross so that we could enjoy great holiday shopping. 
 On the limits of Howe’s reading of Williams, see also Nussbaum, 
supra note 38, at  41, 59; Garry Wills, Head and Heart:  American 
Christianities 97 (2007). 
 Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial 
Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1996), points out that ceremonial deism 
is inconsistent with the main thrust of contemporary establishment 
clause doctrine.  But his argument is not conclusive, because there are 
always two ways of resolving an inconsistency.  When he tries to defend 
a rule of neutrality, the sole concern on which he relies is the 
alienation of nonbelievers.  He does not rely on the corruption 
argument at all.  This makes his argument weaker than it needs to be. 
 41
of dissent in Restoration England was severe, with about 
ten percent of the country’s population subject to 
confiscation of goods, imprisonment, and deportation.  
Locke dissented from all this.  The position he advocated 
was shortly to be enacted in the Toleration Act of 1689, 
which granted freedom of worship to Protestant Trinitarian 
dissenters who took an oath of allegiance.93  (That Act also 
ended the repressive Massachusetts regime that Williams had 
opposed.) 
Locke argued that “the Care of Souls is not committed to 
the Civil Magistrate, any more than to other Men.”94  Part 
of the reason was the limited responsibilities of the 
state, which existed, according to his well-known social 
contract theory, solely in order to protect life, liberty, 
and property.  But another was that “no Man can, if he 
would, conform his Faith to the Dictates of another.”95  
Coerced worship, Locke argues, would be “Hipocrisie, and 
Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”96  Coercion of worship is 
absurd, because what it produces has no religious value.  
“Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and 
the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be 
                                                 
93 James H. Tully, Introduction, in John Locke, A Letter Concerning 
Toleration 1-3 (1689; James H. Tully ed. 1983). 
94 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 26 (1689; James H. Tully 
ed. 1983). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 27. 
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not thoroughly perswaded thereof in my own mind, there will 
be no safety for me in following it.  No way whatsoever 
that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my 
Conscience, will ever bring me to the Mansions of the 
Blessed.”97  Moreover, the religious divisions that existed 
“for the most part” concerned “frivolous things .  . . that 
(without any prejudice to Religion or the Salvation of 
Souls, if not accompanied with Superstition or Hypocrisie) 
might either be observed or omitted,” and that such matters 
ought not to divide “Christian Brethren, who are all agreed 
in the Substantial and truly Fundamental part of 
Religion.”98 
These arguments reach only coercion, and so do not speak 
directly to gentler forms of state authority over religion.  
Locke aspired to a social unity that crossed denominational 
lines, but one that only included Christians.99  But Locke 
also thought that the state was generally incompetent to 
adjudicate religious questions:  “The one only narrow way 
which leads to Heaven is not better known to the Magistrate 
than to private Persons, and therefore I cannot safely take 
him for my Guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the 
                                                 
97 Id. at 38. 
98 Id. at 36. 
99 Wills, supra note 92, at 177-83. 
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way as my self, and who certainly is less concerned for my 
Salvation than I my self am.”100 
Locke’s argument is, of course, loaded with religious 
premises:  that conscience is valuable because it is a way 
of discovering God’s will; that it is sinful to act against 
conscience; that the rights of conscience are inalienable, 
and that no one can legitimately grant to another the right 
to make one’s religious decisions.101 
 
iv.  Samuel Pufendorf 
 
The same premises animate the German philosopher Samuel 
Pufendorf’s Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in 
Reference to Civil Society, written in 1687, two years 
before Locke’s Letter, in reaction to the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes by King Louis XIV.  The revocation outlawed 
Protestantism in France.  Pufendorf is not a direct source 
for American constitutional thought, but he was widely read 
and influential.  When the first English translation of 
this work was published in 1698, Pufendorf “was already 
renowned in England and elsewhere in Europe” for his 
                                                 
100 Locke, supra note 94, at 37. 
101 This is emphasized in Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality 
(2002), especially at 208-211; Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure:  
The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 64-67 
(1995), and Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible:  Settling the Just Bounds 
Between Church and State, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2258-69 (1997).   
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writings on natural law, which “were to play a major role 
in the shaping of German, Scottish, and French moral 
philosophy up to the American and French revolutions.”102 
Pufendorf began with the premise that “every body is 
obliged to worship God in his own Person, religious duty 
being not to be performed by a Deputy, but by himself, in 
Person, who expects to reap the Benefit of religious 
Worship, promised by God Almighty.”103  The state could have 
nothing to do with this: truth could only be imparted by 
convincing arguments, and revelation “must be acquired by 
the assistance of Divine Grace, which is contrary to all 
Violence.”104  God left people free to choose whether to be 
saved or not:  “It was not God Almighty’s pleasure to pull 
People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of the new 
French way of Converting them by Dragoons; But, he has laid 
open to us the way of our Salvation, in such a matter, as 
not to have quite debarr’d us from our own choise; so, that 
if we will be refractory, we may prove the cause of our own 
                                                 
102 Simone Zurburchen, Introduction, in Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Nature 
and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society x-xi (1687; 
Simone Zurburchen ed. 2002).  However, “[e]xcept for the treatises on 
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work.  See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution 23, 27, 29, 43, 150 (1967). 
103 Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference 
to Civil Society, at 13. 
104 Id. at 15. 
 45
Destruction.”105  If orthodoxy is forcibly imposed, “by such 
Methods, perhaps the Commonwealth may be stock’d with 
Hypocrites, and dissembling Hereticks, but few will be 
brought over to the Orthodox Christian Faith.”106  The 
existence of open dissent may even “contribute to the 
encrease of the Zeal and Learning of the established 
Clergy,” as evidenced by the fact that “in those places and 
times, where and when no Religious Differences were in 
agitation, the Clergy soon degenerated into Idleness and 
Barbarity.”107  Pufendorf’s book is replete with Biblical 
quotations and citations. 
Note how the character and scope of the threatened 
corruption depends on the nature of the religion that needs 
to be protected from corruption.  Unlike Roger Williams, 
Pufendorf does not deny that churches are legitimate 
institutions.  Unlike Milton or Locke, he does not deny the 
competence of the state to determine religious matters.  
For Pufendorf, corruption consists in the forcing of 
individual consciences and the suppression of views 
regarded by the sovereign as heretical. 
 
v.  Elisha Williams 
                                                 
105 Id. at 33. 
106 Id. at 78. 
107 Id. at 109. 
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The religious character of the corruption argument is 
perhaps clearest in Congregationalist minister Elisha 
Williams’s The Essential Rights and Liberties of 
Protestants.  Williams’s pamphlet denounced a 1742 
Connecticut law prohibiting ministers from preaching 
outside their own parishes. 
That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith 
and practice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed 
in; and must therefore inviolably maintain, that every 
Christian has a right of judging for himself what he is 
to believe and practice in religion according to that 
rule . . . . Every one is under an indispensable 
obligation to search the scripture for himself (which 
contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of it 
he can for his own information in the will of GOD, the 
nature and duties of Christianity. And as every 
Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable right to 
judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his 
judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal right with 
any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical. . . . That 
faith and practice which depends on the judgment and 
choice of any other person, and not on the person’s own 
understanding judgment and choice, may pass for religion 
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in the synagogue of Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance 
is the mother of devotion; but with no understanding 
Protestant will it pass for any religion at all.108 
The idea that beliefs founded on the authority of other 
people are worthless, so prominent in Milton, appears again 
in Williams. 
Now inasmuch as the scriptures are the only rule of 
faith and practice to a Christian; hence every one has 
an unalienable right to read, enquire into, and 
impartially judge of the sense and meaning of it for 
himself.  For if he is to be governed and determined 
therein by the opinions and determinations of any 
others, the scriptures cease to be a rule for him, and 
those opinions and determinations of others are 
substituted in the room thereof.109 
The principle of establishment, Williams argued, “has 
proved the grand engine of oppressing truth, Christianity, 
and murdering the best men the world has had in it; 
promoting and securing heresy, superstition and idolatry; 
and ought to be abhorred by all Christians.”110   
                                                 
108 Elisha Williams, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants 
(1744), in 1 Political Sermons of the Founding Era 1730-1805, at 55, 
61, 62 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998).  Williams also relies on a 
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109 Id. at 63. 
110 Id. at 77. 
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 Williams did not, however, object to noncoercive 
endorsement of religion:  “if by the word establish be 
meant only an approbation of certain articles of faith and 
modes of worship, of government, or recommendation of them 
to their subjects; I am not arguing against it.”111  Thomas 
Curry observes a deep tension within Williams’s views on 
this point.  Like other Congregational writers, he “assumed 
that there existed a fundamental Christianity that every 
reasonable Christian could advocate and, consequently, that 
the State could promote without violating anyone’s 
conscience.”  This “usually took the formed believed in by 
themselves.”112  But they would become uncomfortable as soon 
as the state began to promote positions with which they 
disagreed. 
 Williams’s entire argument is premised on a set of 
obligations that “all Protestants are agreed in.”  From 
those obligations derive limitations on state power.  If 
you don’t accept his Protestant premises, however, the 
argument can have no weight at all. 
 
B.  The founding generation 
 
                                                 
111 Id. at 73. 
112 Curry, supra note 52, at 118. 
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 Proponents of the corruption argument at the time of the 
founding came out of two very different religious factions.  
By far the more numerous were the Baptists, led by Backus 
and Leland.  But the principal spokespersons for the 
argument were Enlightenment Deists such as Jefferson, 
Paine, and Madison. 
 
i.  Isaac Backus 
 
 The minister Isaac Backus wrote “the most complete and 
well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church 
and state in the eighteenth century.”113  He and his much 
younger colleague Leland, discussed below, were the leaders 
of the Baptist movement for separation.  Like his admired 
predecessors Roger Williams and Locke, Backus was centrally 
concerned about corruption:  “bringing in an earthly power 
between Christ and his people has been the grand source of 
anti-Christian abominations.”114  Backus’s specific target 
was the levying of religious taxes upon those who did not 
subscribe to the established religion and the jailing of 
                                                 
113 William G. McLoughlin, Introduction, in Isaac Backus on Church, 
State, and Calvinism 41-42 (William G. McLoughlin ed. 1968). 
114 Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public For Religious Liberty (1773), 
in id. at 334. 
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unlicensed preachers.115  Both were persistent grievances of 
the Baptists. 
Like all the other writers we have examined, Backus 
relied on the voluntarist premise:  “As God is the only 
worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be 
true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed 
will, of which each rational soul has an equal right to 
judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to 
act in all religious affairs according to the full 
persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured 
thereby."116  After some agonizing on the issue, he rejected 
infant baptism.117  He thought preachers should be those who 
feel God’s call.  External qualifications, such as a 
college education or ordination, hindered God’s work.118 
                                                 
115 McLoughlin, Introduction, supra note 113, at 31.  “Though never 
imprisoned himself, he was several times in imminent danger of it.”  
Id. at 31 n.11. 
116 Isaac Backus, Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the 
Massachusetts Constitution, 1779, in id. at 487.  Put another way, “in 
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wanted it so men might seek the truth wherever reason may lead.”  
Introduction, supra note 113, at 47-48.  See also William G. 
McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in 
America, 73 Am. Hist. Rev. 1392, 1403-04 (1968)(drawing a similar 
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Christian establishment did not lead to pure religion.  
Rather, “tyranny, simony, and robbery came to be introduced 
and to be practiced so long, under the Christian name.”119  
Ministers who sought state support were unchristian:  “can 
any man in the light of truth maintain his character as a 
minister of Christ if he is not contented with all that 
Christ’s name and influence will procure for him but will 
have recourse to the kings of the earth to force money from 
the people to support him under the name of an ambassador 
of the God of Heaven.”120  Religious duties could not be 
delegated:  “In all civil governments some are appointed to 
judge for others and have power to compel others to submit 
to their judgment, but our Lord has most plainly forbidden 
us either to assume or submit to any such thing in 
religion.”121  The state was also an unreliable source of 
religious guidance.  “[A]s all earthly states are 
changeable, the same sword that Constantine drew against 
heretics, Julian turned against the orthodox.”122 
Backus was, however, a less strong separationist than 
his ally Jefferson.  He did not oppose official 
proclamation of fast days and days of prayer.  He supported 
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a law confining public officeholding to Christians.123  He 
endorsed a petition requesting Congress to create a bureau 
to license the publication of Bibles, lest there be 
erroneous or heretical translations.124  He did not object 
to laws requiring attendance at church.125  In one tract he 
opposed paying Episcopalian chaplains for Congress, but, 
McLoughlin observes, “that was because they were 
Episcopalians.”126  His views on church and state, 
McLoughlin concludes, were “far less logical and 
consistent”127 than those of his better-known contemporaries 
Madison, Jefferson, or even Leland.  Rather, his view 
resembled that of the proponents of noncoercive 
establishment, such as John Adams, who regarded the rights 
of conscience as “indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, 
[and] divine,” yet who nonetheless favored state-supported 
establishments.128  
 
ii.  Thomas Jefferson 
                                                 
123 McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 50. 
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Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential rational 
Enlightenment proponent of separation, also relied on 
religious arguments about the corrupting effects of 
establishment.  In his 1777 Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, he proposed to do away with all religious coercion 
and all taxation to support churches:  “no man shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, 
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, 
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, 
nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious 
opinions or belief.”129 
Jefferson, too, relied on theological premises.  He 
noted that “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” and 
from this he inferred that “all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil 
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and 
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy 
author of our religion, who being lord both of body and 
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, 
as was in his Almighty power to do.”130  He also noted the 
                                                 
129 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 347 (Merrill D. Peterson ed. 1984).  
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state’s incompetence:  “the impious presumption of 
legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, 
who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have 
assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their 
own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and 
infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on 
others, hath established and maintained false religions 
over the greatest part of the world and through all 
time.”131  He specifically invoked corruption:  
establishment “tends also to corrupt the principles of that 
very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a 
monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who will 
externally profess and conform to it.”132  And all this was 
unnecessary.  Echoing Milton, Jefferson wrote that “truth 
is great and will prevail if left to herself.”133   
He repeated these arguments a few years later in his 
Notes on the State of Virginia.  He explained that 
religious dissent in Virginia had been fostered by 
establishment:  “the great care of the government to 
support their own church, having begotten an equal degree 
of indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had 
become dissenters at the commencement of the present 
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132 Id. at 347.  That the prevention of corruption is the dominant theme 
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133 Jefferson, supra note 129, at 347. 
 55
revolution.”134  Establishment was a violation of natural 
right.  “[O]ur rulers can have authority over such natural 
rights only as we have submitted to them.  The rights of 
conscience we never submitted, we could not submit.  We are 
answerable for them to our God.”135  The effect of religious 
coercion has been “[t]o make one half the world fools, and 
the other half hypocrites.”136  But Jefferson’s argument, 
too, goes beyond coercion to imply a more general state 
neutrality toward religion.  “Difference of opinion is 
advantageous in religion.  The several sects perform the 
office of a Censor morum over each other.”137 
Thus, Jefferson famously advocated a “wall of separation 
between church and State.”138  He eliminated the chairs of 
Divinity at the College of William and Mary, and prevented 
such chairs from being established at the University of 
Virginia, which did not even have a chaplain while he was 
its rector.139 
Jefferson’s idea of corruption was quite distinct from 
that of the earlier thinkers we have considered, because he 
was a deist who regarded any religious mystery as a foolish 
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superstition.  He was an admirer of Joseph Priestley’s 
History of the Corruptions of Christianity, which denounced 
such core Christian doctrines as the resurrection and the 
Trinity.140  While he was President, he prepared a new, 
corrected version of the Bible, using scissors and razor to 
excise from the New Testament any claim of the divinity of 
Jesus.141  The corruption of Christianity consisted 
precisely in its capture by institutions that sought state 
largesse: 
My opinion is that there would never have been an 
infidel, if there had never been a priest.  The 
artificial structure they have built on the purest of 
all moral systems, for the purpose of deriving from it 
pence and power, revolts those who think for themselves, 
and who read in that system only what is really there.142 
Jefferson’s view had the potential to overlap with that 
of the religious proponents of disestablishment we have 
considered earlier.  Because his theological views were so 
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different, however, they implied a dramatically different 
understanding of what counted as corruption. 
 
iii.  Thomas Paine 
 
Similar to Jefferson, but even starker in his 
rejection of traditional religious dogmas, was Thomas 
Paine.  Paine was the author of Common Sense, “the most 
incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary 
era.”143  His deism places him well outside the mainstream 
of contemporary American religion, though the ideals he 
articulates were pervasive among the educated elite.144  He 
trumpeted ideas that other framers, such as Washington and 
Franklin, privately believed but thought it prudent to keep 
to themselves.145   
Paine believed in God, but rejected all of the 
specific doctrines of Christianity, which he regarded as a 
collection of unbelievable superstitions.  He thought that 
“religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, 
and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy.”146  
This, he thought, was the true teaching of Jesus Christ, 
                                                 
143 Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution:  A History 55 (2002). 
144 On the place of Deism in 18th century America, see Holmes, supra note 
140, at 1-51 (2006). 
145 See Holmes, supra note 140, at 53-71. 
146 Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, in The Thomas Paine Reader 400 
(Michael Foot and Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987). 
 58
but institutionalized Christianity “has set up a religion 
of pomp and of revenue, in pretended imitation of a person 
whose life was humility and poverty.”147  Establishment 
corrupted religion precisely insofar as state support 
tended to perpetuate “wild and whimsical systems of faith 
and of religion.148 
The adulterous connection of church and state, 
wherever it has taken place, whether Jewish, Christian 
or Turkish, has so effectually prohibited by pains and 
penalties every discussion upon established creeds, 
and upon first principles of religion, that until the 
system of government should be changed, those subjects 
could not be brought fairly and openly before the 
world; but that whenever this should be done, a 
revolution in the system of religion would follow.  
Human inventions and priestcraft would be detected; 
and man would return to the pure, unmixed and 
unadulterated belief of one God, and no more.149 
Paine confirmed the worst fears of proponents of 
establishment by holding that without state support, the 
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central dogmas of Christianity would wither away.  Paine, 
however, regarded this as cause for celebration. 
 
iv.  John Leland 
 
 It was not necessary to be a deist in order to support 
strong separation.  One of Jefferson’s most loyal allies 
was the Baptist minister John Leland.150  Like Backus, he 
was primarily concerned with systems of taxation and 
licensing that burdened nonconforming religions.  Far more 
consistent than Backus, he strongly opposed any involvement 
of the state in religious matters.  He was an important 
source of the pressure to promise an amendment banning 
establishment in exchange for the ratification of the 
Constitution.  There are even unconfirmable stories 
indicating that, had Madison not promised Leland to work 
for such an amendment, Leland would have derailed the 
Constitution by blocking ratification in Virginia.151 
Leland, like the other writers we have examined, took 
religious voluntarism as a basic premise.  “Every man must 
                                                 
150 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 156-57. 
151 L. H. Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 
Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc. 154, 183-96 (1952).  The evidence that the 
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give an account of himself to God, and therefore every man 
ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he can 
best reconcile it to his conscience.  If government can 
answer for individuals at the day of judgment, let men be 
controled by it in religious matters; otherwise let men be 
free.”152  The state was an unreliable source of religious 
guidance:  “It is error, and error alone, that needs human 
support; and whenever men fly to the law or sword to 
protect their system of religion, and force it upon others, 
it is evident that they have something in their system that 
will not bear the light, and stand upon the basis of 
truth.”153  Establishments foster contempt for religion; 
they “metamorphose the church into a creature, and religion 
into a principle of state; which has a natural tendency to 
make men conclude that bible religion is nothing but a 
trick of state.”154  Even if nonconformity is tolerated, but 
certain beliefs favored, “the minds of men are biassed to 
embrace that religion which is favored and pampered by law 
(and thereby hypocrisy is nourished) while those who cannot 
stretch their consciences to believe any thing and every 
thing in the established creed are treated with contempt 
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and opprobrious names.”155  The state should not have any 
power to provide for ministers, enact Sabbath laws, pay 
military chaplains, or have any religious qualifications 
for office.156  He opposed a proposal to end delivery of the 
mail on Sundays.157 
Leland was as suspicious of dead religious forms as 
Milton.  He opposed Sunday schools, theological seminaries, 
and missionary societies, because their “natural tendency” 
was “to reduce the gospel to school divinity, and represent 
the work of the Holy Unction in the heart, to be no more 
than what men can perform for themselves and for others; 
and also to fill the ministerial ranks with pharisaical 
hypocrites.”158  Even communion was of doubtful value, 
because after “more than thirty years experiment, I have 
had no evidence that the bread and wine ever assisted my 
faith to discern the Lord’s body.  I have never felt guilty 
for not communing, but often for doing it.”159 
 A common strand in all of these arguments is religious 
individualism – the view that religious truth was a matter 
between the individual and God.  Thomas Sanders observes 
that Leland brought the individualism of the Enlightenment 
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into religion, by abandoning the Puritan conception of a 
community governed, collectively, by God’s law.  “The form, 
nature, and significance of the church receded behind a 
preoccupation with the conversion of single souls, and the 
church represented no more than a voluntary compact of 
individuals.”160  This assumption was pervasive at the time 
of the founding.  In the late eighteenth century, Mark Noll 
observes, most Americans “shared both a mistrust of 
intellectual authorities inherited from previous 
generations and a belief that true knowledge arose from the 
use of one’s own senses – whether the external senses for 
information about nature and society or the moral sense for 
ethical and aesthetic judgments.  Most Americans were thus 
united in the conviction that people had to think for 
themselves in order to know science, morality, economics, 
politics, and especially theology.”161  A state-sponsored 
orthodoxy was as counterproductive in theology as it would 
be in any of these other fields.  Salvation was a matter 
for the individual.  “My best judgment tells me that my 
neighbor does wrong,” Leland wrote, “but guilt is not 
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transferable.  Every one must give an account of 
himself.”162 
Yet despite his alliance with Jefferson, Leland was no 
rationalist.  He preached “the great doctrines of universal 
depravity, redemption by the blood of Christ, regeneration, 
faith, repentance, and self-denial.”163  He once heard the 
voice of God speaking to him.  One night, some devilish 
ghost approached his bed, groaning so horribly that Leland 
hid under the bedclothes and prayed to God for help.  He 
said, “I know myself to be a feeble, sinful worm.”164  Yet 
he was indifferent to most theological controversies.165  
Feeling mattered to him more than doctrine.166  He made 
Jeffersonian political philosophy appealing to his poor, 
ignorant, and enthusiastic followers, and thus “succeeded 
in linking the political philosophy of the American 
enlightenment with the camp-meeting spirit.”167 
 
v.  James Madison 
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 The radical Protestantism of Backus and Leland and the 
deism of Jefferson and Paine were brilliantly synthesized 
by Madison in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments, the classic description of the 
pathologies that the founding generation associated with 
establishment.  Madison, of course, is the one who actually 
led the movement for disestablishment, first leading the 
fight in Virginia, then as principal author of the First 
Amendment. 
 Madison’s argument reaches well beyond coercion, because 
it was offered against a bill that attempted to provide 
nonpreferential aid to religion.  The bill in question 
would have allowed all Christian churches to receive tax 
money, and would have permitted each taxpayer to designate 
the church to receive his tax.  If the taxpayer refused to 
designate a church, the funds would go to schools.168  Even 
this nonpreferential aid, Madison thought, tended to 
corrupt religion. 
 Madison was a rationalist Deist.  He deplored the fact 
that “accidental differences in political, religious, and 
other opinions” were the cause of factional disputes.  
“However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of 
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dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened 
Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of 
mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will 
continue to view them in a different light.”169  The 
coalition he led, however, consisted predominantly of 
Baptists and Presbyterians.  All supported freedom of 
conscience, thought that religion was essentially 
voluntary, and regarded man’s allegiance to God as prior to 
state authority.  But the rationalists emphasized natural 
rights and the use of reason in the pursuit of religious 
truth, while the religious dissenters wanted to free man to 
respond to God’s call and the scriptural teachings of 
Christ.  Each side drew on the other’s rhetoric, but they 
had fundamentally different goals.170  Madison’s task was to 
bring them together into a political coalition that could 
disestablish Anglicanism in Virginia. 
The Memorial and Remonstrance begins with a 
theological claim, offering an understanding of religious 
duty which at this point will be familiar:  “It is the duty 
of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such 
only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is 
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precedent, both in order of time and in degree of 
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”  Madison 
further argued that the idea “that the Civil Magistrate is 
a competent Judge of Religious Truth” is “an arrogant 
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of 
Rulers in all ages.”  The idea that religion should be 
promoted because it conduces to good citizenship, an idea 
that we often hear even today, Madison denounced as an 
attempt to “employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy,” 
which he thought “an unhallowed perversion of the means of 
salvation.”171  Moreover,  
experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical 
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and 
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. 
During almost fifteen centuries has the legal 
establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have 
been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and 
indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in 
the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and 
persecution.172 
                                                 
171 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, in Marvin Meyers ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of 
the Political Thought of James Madison 9 (rev. ed. 1981).)   
172 Id. at 9-10.  The importance of the corruption theme in the Memorial 
is further elaborated in Wills, supra note 92, at 207-22. 
 67
Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs, 
which were probably some variant of Deism,173 but the 
Memorial and Remonstrance is nonetheless the most useful 
source of anti-establishment thinking.  It was a public 
document, not a private statement of Madison’s views.  It 
presented a synthesis of the anti-establisment views that 
prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments 
designed to appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular 
arguments designed to appeal to Enlightenment Lockeans.174  
It is unlikely that these groups agreed on anything more 
than the propositions stated by Madison himself.  But they 
did agree about them.175 
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What Madison achieved in Virginia is a fine early 
example of the kind of overlapping consensus contemplated 
by Taylor.  A collection of very different comprehensive 
views of the purpose of human life converges on a set of 
political principles.  The Memorial states a set of 
pathologies that are to be avoided, which can be regarded 
as pathologies from a variety of different points of view.  
Different members of his coalition had different ideas 
about why these were pathologies.  They had fundamentally 
different ideas of what a non-corrupted religion would look 
like.  Madison was carefully noncommittal about which of 
them was right.  The coalition did not last long.  It 
shortly fragmented over support for the French 
Revolution.176  But by that time, the Establishment Clause 
had been adopted, and it remains in the Constitution. 
Later, as President, Madison vetoed a Congressional 
act incorporating an Episcopal congregation in the District 
of Columbia, and at first refused to issue proclamations of 
days of thanksgiving and prayer.  He later did issue such 
proclamations, but still later, said that this was a 
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mistake.  Finally, in an unpublished memorandum written 
late in his life and found after his death, he opposed the 
creation of Congressional and military chaplains.177 
 
C.  Other formulations 
 
We have concluded our review of the use of the 
corruption argument up to the time of the framing of the 
First Amendment.  There are, however, three other writers 
who have had such a powerful influence on modern thinking 
about the corrupting effect of establishments that they 
should be considered here.  Two of them, Adam Smith and 
Alexis de Tocqueville, are major political theorists.  The 
third, Justice Hugo Black, is the principal architect of 
modern Establishment Clause doctrine. 
 
i.  Adam Smith 
 
 Smith did not participate in the framing.  He never 
traveled to the United States, spending most of his life in 
his native Scotland.  But he was widely read in America.  
The Wealth of Nations was found in 28 percent of American 
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libraries in the period from 1777-1790, exceeding the 
holdings of Locke’s Treatises and any book by Rousseau 
except Emile.  Smith had a substantial impact on the 
thinking of the framers of the Constitution, and 
particularly on Madison’s views about religious liberty.178 
 Smith focused, not on coercion, but on state financial 
support for an established church.  He thought that if 
clergy were given dependable incomes from the state, 
“[t]heir exertion, their zeal and industry,”179 were likely 
to be much diminished. 
The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion 
frequently become men of learning and elegance, who 
possess all the virtues of gentlemen; but they are apt 
gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, 
which gave them authority and influence with the 
inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been 
the original causes of the success and establishment 
of their religion.180 
Smith was responding to his friend David Hume’s 
defense of established churches.  In a passage that Smith 
quoted at length, Hume argued that the “interested 
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diligence” of the clergy, spurred by the need for voluntary 
contributions of support, “is what every wise legislator 
will study to prevent, because, in every religion except 
the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a 
natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a 
strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.”  Such 
superstitious delusions, together with “the most violent 
abhorrence of all other sects,” is what is most likely to 
draw customers.  The way to avoid this pernicious behavior 
by the clergy is “to bribe their indolence, by assigning 
stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it 
superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to 
prevent their flock from straying in quest of new 
pastures.”181 
Smith agreed that, absent establishment, each pastor 
would be pressed try to increase the number of his 
disciples.  “But as every other teacher would have felt 
himself under the same necessity, the success of no one 
teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great.”182  
The consequence would be “a great multitude of religious 
sects.”183  This pressure would in turn produce a better 
religion than an establishment could: 
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The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves 
almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of 
almost every other sect, and the concessions which 
they would mutually find it both convenient and 
agreeable to make to one another, might in time reduce 
the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure 
and rational religion, free from every mixture of 
absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism . . . .184 
Smith also thought that small religious sects were much 
more likely than large churches to police the conduct of 
their members and keep them away from the dangers of 
profligacy and vice that were particularly ubiquitous in 
large cities.185 
 Samuel Fleischacker thinks it unlikely that Madison 
had read The Wealth of Nations at the time he wrote the 
Memorial and Remonstrance, but argues that the arguments 
against establishment just cited did have an influence on 
Madison’s famous argument in Federalist 10 that political 
factions could more easily be controlled in a large 
republic.  Madison there responds to the widespread concern 
that in democracies, majorities will be prone to oppress 
minorities.  Federalist 10 claims that this danger will be 
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averted by the size of the new American republic that the 
Constitution would create.  “Extend the sphere and you take 
in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it 
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for 
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act 
in unison with each other.”186  Madison makes the point 
specifically with respect to religious factions:  “a 
religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a 
part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed 
over the entire face of it must secure the national 
councils against any danger from that source.”187 
 Fleischacker observes the similarity between Madison’s 
analysis of factions and Smith’s analysis of sects:  mutual 
conflict makes both weaker and less capable of achieving 
pernicious ends that they regard as their good.  Both 
thought that deep features of human nature produce this 
result:  “people generally want to be addressed in 
truthful, decent terms, rather than with the accent of 
passion and prejudice, strong emotions driving fanaticism 
tend to dominate only for short periods of time and are 
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discouraged in normal social intercourse, and people have 
economic and other interests connecting them with a great 
range of others in society.”188  Because social forces tended 
to temper the problem, there was less need for enlightened 
statesmen to do the job.  “Both Madison and Smith saw the 
liberty that gave rein to such interests as compatible with 
a republic that would be concerned, for the most part, with 
fostering virtue.”189  For both, uncorrupted religion could 
be known by its fruits:  peaceable, virtuous behavior. 
 It’s worth noting for a moment here a now-familiar 
argument that neither of them was making, but that is 
easily confused with theirs.  That is the idea that 
religion is improved by market-like competition, in which 
the better religions succeed and the worse ones go out of 
business.  Friedrich Hayek, in some ways a disciple of 
Smith, makes this claim.  Hayek thought that the 
persistence of customs conducive to social cooperation was 
closely tied to the support those customs received from 
religion.  Of course, not all religions had this beneficent 
effect.  “Among the founders of religions over the last two 
thousand years, many opposed property and the family.  But 
the only religions that have survived are those which 
                                                 
188 Fleischacker, supra note 178, at __. 
189 Id. 
 75
support property and the family.”190  The process by which 
the pertinent selection occurred may have been invisible to 
those who benefited from it.  “Customs whose beneficial 
effects were unperceivable by those practicing them were 
likely to be preserved long enough to increase their 
selective advantage only when supported by some other 
strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or magic 
faiths were readily available to perform this role.”191  What 
matters is that the customs that survived were the ones 
that “influence[ed] men to do what was required to maintain 
the structure enabling them to nourish their enlarging 
numbers.”192 
 It is clear what Hayek’s notion of uncorrupted 
religion is:  any set of beliefs (whether they are true or 
false does not matter) that enables people to engage, 
“peacefully though competitively, in pursuing thousands of 
different ends of their own choosing in collaboration with 
thousands of persons whom they will never know.”193  Hayek 
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himself was an atheist who regarded the notion of God as 
unintelligible;194 effects were all he cared about. 
 The dynamic of competition contemplated by Hayek is 
quite unlike that of Madison or Smith, primarily because of 
Hayek’s evident reliance on the theories of Max Weber and 
Charles Darwin.195  Weber argued that the early growth of 
capitalism in Europe was facilitated by militant Calvinism, 
which promoted rationality, calculating frugality, and the 
highly systematized pursuit of profit.  This, he thought, 
was why the most prosperous parts of Europe in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Protestant ones: 
Holland, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and the Huguenot 
communities of France.196  Darwin thought that some traits 
became more common in successive generations of organisms 
because those traits were more conducive to their carriers’ 
survival in a given environment.197  Hayek’s model combines a 
Darwinian model of competition with a Weberian model of the 
effect of some religious ideas on economic behavior.  
Religions that promote economic cooperation, as early 
Protestantism did, are most likely to survive and prosper. 
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 Madison and Smith had a very different idea of the 
effects of competition.  They both thought that the 
factions themselves would intentionally modify their 
behavior in the face of competition.  Darwin did not think 
that species intentionally evolved.  Weber did not think 
that the Calvinists were deliberately aiming at the 
creation of a capitalist economy.  For Hayek, cooperation-
inducing rules need not be adopted for that purpose:  
“Neither the groups who first practised these rules, nor 
those who imitated them, need ever have known why their 
conduct was more successful than that of others, or helped 
the group persist.”198 
 Hayek did not care about religion as such at all.  He 
liked it because he thought it was instrumentally good.  He 
thus parts company with both Madison and Smith. 
 
ii.  Alexis de Tocqueville 
 
 A variant of the corruption argument holds that 
establishment can only generate the kind of religion that 
people are likely to hold in low regard.  This argument was 
pressed during the election of 1800 by followers of 
Jefferson, who wanted to discourage Federalist clergy from 
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opposing Jefferson for his deism.199  (As we just saw, it was 
also anticipated by Hume, who however thought that the 
decline of religious enthusiasm was a good thing and so 
supported establishment.) 
Here the baseline against which corruption is measured 
is not the Protestant one of personal communion with God, 
but simply sincere religiosity, whatever its content.  The 
argument thus is less pervasively Protestant.  But it 
continues to presume that religion is a good thing, and 
that this good thing can be corrupted by state sponsorship.  
The classic proponent of this argument is Alexis de 
Tocqueville. 
Tocqueville, writing at about the time that the last 
establishment in America was being abandoned, thought that 
in the new egalitarian regime of the United States, the old 
feudal morality had disappeared, and a pressing question 
was what kinds of morality would take its place.  The 
answer was that people would be motivated by “self-interest 
properly understood.”200  They could be made to understand 
that it was in their self-interest to do good and serve 
their fellow creatures.  The rational pursuit of self-
interest would not produce heroes, but it would shape “a 
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lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and self-
controlled citizens.”201 
Religion played a crucial role in bringing about this 
understanding.  “The main business of religions is to 
purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive 
taste for well-being which men acquire in times of equality 
. . . .”202  Tocqueville was silent on the theological 
issues, but he thought religious belief important to the 
well-being of democracy.  “How could society escape 
destruction if, when political ties are relaxed, moral ties 
are not tightened? And what can be done with a people 
master of itself if it is not subject to God?”203   
 All religions, Tocqueville thought, had salutary 
social consequences: 
Every religion places the object of man’s desires 
outside and beyond worldly goods and naturally lifts 
the soul into regions far above the realm of the 
senses.  Every religion also imposes on each man some 
obligations toward mankind, to be performed in common 
with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away, from 
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time to time, from thinking about himself.  That is 
true even of the most false and dangerous religions.204 
 The American experience had taught that the best way 
to promote religion was to keep the state away from it.  
Man is naturally religious.  Because “the incomplete joys 
of this world will never satisfy his heart,”205 he is 
naturally driven, by “an invincible inclination,”206 toward 
contemplation of another world. 
The “intellectual aberration”207 of unbelief had arisen 
in Europe, Tocqueville thought, only because of 
establishment.  Because religion had become identified with 
a conservative politics, it aroused the opposition of 
anyone who opposed the conservative party.  It thereby 
forfeited its natural strength. 
As long as religion relies only upon the sentiments 
which are the consolation of every affliction, it can 
draw the heart of mankind to itself. When it is 
mingled with the bitter passions of this world, it is 
sometimes constrained to defend allies who are such 
from interest rather than from love; and it has to 
repulse as adversaries men who still love religion, 
although they are fighting against religion's allies. 
                                                 
204 Id. at 444-45. 
205 Id. at 296. 
206 Id. at 297. 
207 Id. 
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Hence religion cannot share the material strength of 
the rulers without being burdened with some of the 
animosity roused against them.208 
 This, Tocqueville thought, was why religious faith had 
withered in Europe.  “Unbelievers in Europe attack 
Christians more as political than as religious enemies; 
they hate the faith as the opinion of a party much more 
than as a mistaken belief, and they reject the clergy less 
because they are the representatives of God than because 
they are the friends of authority.”209  In America, on the 
other hand, religion was powerful precisely because it was 
not associated with any party.  All the clergy with whom 
Tocqueville spoke during his visit to America agreed that 
“the main reason for the quite sway of religion over their 
country was the complete separation of church and state.”210 
 Tocqueville agrees with Smith and Hume that sincere 
and enthusiastic religion is likely to be promoted by 
disestablishment, and he insists, even more than Smith, 
that religious enthusiasm is likely to conduce to virtue.  
                                                 
208 Id. at 297. 
209 Id. at 300-01.  Contemporary scholarship agrees with Tocqueville’s 
claims about the reason for the decline of religion in Europe.  See 
Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 27-29 (1994); 
Shiffrin, supra note 16, at 48-54.  On the other hand, establishment, 
of an unusually oppressive kind, has not diminished religiosity in 
Iran.  When survey takers asked if respondents believed in God, 99 
percent in Iran, 94 percent in the United States, and 56 percent in 
France said yes.  Steven Goldberg, Bleached Faith:  The Tragic Cost 
When Religion is Forced into the Public Square 95 (2008). 
210 Tocqueville, supra note 200, at 295. 
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He is too sanguine, however, in his suggestion that “even . 
. . the most false and dangerous religions” can produce 
these valuable results.  Marvin Zetterbaum observes that 
Tocqueville’s solution to the problem of how to make self-
centered people virtuous “lies in a simple extension of the 
principle of self-interest to include the rewards of a 
future life.”211  But it matters what those rewards are 
supposed to be rewards for.  It is true that one must look 
beyond narrow self-interest in order to be willing to fly 
an airplane into a building.212  Steven Smith has observed 
that “we cannot sensibly talk about the effects of 
‘religion’ on character because different forms of religion 
attempt to inculcate very different character traits.”213  
Whether religion is conducive to virtue “also depends on 
the kind of virtues that a particular society chooses to 
foster.”214  Tocqueville’s vagueness on this point 
anticipates the famous remark of Dwight Eisenhower that 
“our form of government has no sense unless it is founded 
                                                 
211 Marvin Zetterbaum, Alexis de Tocqueville, in History of Political 
Philosophy 778 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987). 
212 On the psychological and sociological forces inherent in religion 
that sometimes produce intolerance and persecution, see William P. 
Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 Hastings L.J. 843 (1993). 
213 Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure 102 (1995). 
214 Id. 
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in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it 
is.”215 
 
iii.  Hugo Black 
 
 The architect of modern Establishment Clause law is 
Justice Hugo Black, who wrote the most important early 
opinions interpreting the Clause.216  Decisions authored by 
him declared that the Establishment Clause was applicable 
to the states,217 that a “released time” program in which 
religious instruction was offered in the public schools was 
unconstitutional,218 that state officeholders could not be 
required to profess a belief in God,219 and that state-
authored school prayers violated the Constitution.220 
The last of these contained the most explicit 
invocation of the corruption rationale in any Supreme Court 
opinion, quoted more fully above,221 which concluded with 
the declaration that “religion is too personal, too sacred, 
                                                 
215 Quoted in Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics:  Religion and America Since 
World War II 40 (1988).  Less famously, Eisenhower made clear in the 
next sentence that he was not talking about just any religion at all:  
“With us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a 
religion that all men are created equal.”  Id. 
216 The following discussion is heavily indebted to Dane, supra note 32, 
at 568-71. 
217 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
218 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
219 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
220 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
221 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil 
magistrate.”222  According to one account, when Black 
delivered the judgment of the Court, his “‘voice trembled 
with emotion as he paused over ‘too personal, too sacred, 
too holy’ . . . And he added extemporaneously, ‘The prayer 
of each man from his soul must be his and his alone.’”223  
Three days after the decision was announced, in a letter 
explaining his decision to a niece, Black dismissed the 
idea that “prayer must be recited parrot-like in public 
places in order to be effective,” citing the passage of the 
Sermon on the Mount that emphasizes the value of praying 
privately.224 
Similarly strong language appears in his dissent in 
Zorach v. Clauson.225  “Under our system of religious 
freedom, people have gone to their religious sanctuaries 
                                                 
222 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.   
223 Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography 523 (1994). 
224 Id. at 523-24; Dane, supra note 32, at 569.  He reportedly cited the 
same passage in other correspondence concerning Engel.  See Mr. Justice 
and Mrs. Black:  The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black and Elizabeth Black 95 
(1986).  His son recalls him saying, in response to the protest against 
Engel:  “Most of these people who are complaining, son, are pure 
hypocrites who never pray anywhere but in public for the credit of it.  
Prayer ought to be a private thing, just like religion for a truly 
religious person.”  Hugo Black, Jr., My Father:  A Remembrance 176 
(1975). 
 Similar impatience with the rote recitation of words not felt is 
evident in a concurring opinion he coauthored with Justice Douglas in 
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943)(Black, 
J., and Douglas, J., concurring):  “Words uttered under coercion are 
proof of loyalty to nothing but self-interest. Love of country must 
spring from willing hearts and free minds . . . .” 
225 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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not because they feared the law but because they loved 
their God. The choice of all has been as free as the choice 
of those who answered the call to worship moved only by the 
music of the old Sunday morning church bells. The spiritual 
mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or 
doubt, without repression, great or small, by the heavy 
hand of government.”226  The language of the holy and the 
sacred appear once again:  “State help to religion injects 
political and party prejudices into a holy field. . . . 
Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft 
euphemism of ‘co-operation,’ to steal into the sacred area 
of religious choice.”227 
 Similar themes can be found in almost all of his 
Establishment Clause opinions.228  He quoted with approval 
the religious anti-establishment arguments of Roger 
Williams, Jefferson and Madison.229   On this basis he laid 
down the most fundamental Establishment Clause 
restrictions, most of which remain unquestioned to this 
day: 
                                                 
226 Id. at 319-20. 
227 Id. at 320. 
228 The exception is his concurrence in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97  
(1968), in which he argued that a statute barring the teaching of 
evolution in the public schools should be invalidated on grounds of 
vagueness rather than as an Establishment Clause violation.  He there 
suggested that, because both Darwin and the Bible were excluded from 
the curriculum, it was arguable that the exclusion “leave[s] the State 
in a neutral position toward these supposedly competing religious and 
anti-religious doctrines.”  Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring). 
229 Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13; Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-34. 
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The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly 
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
“a wall of separation between Church and State.”230 
                                                 
230 Id. at 15-16.  He fought with Justice Felix Frankfurter over whether 
this opinion ought to be cited in subsequent Supreme Court opinions.   
See James F. Simon, The Antagonists:  Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and 
Civil Liberties in Modern America 180-83 (1989); Samuel A. Alito, Note, 
The “Released Time” Cases Revisited:  A Study of Group Decisionmaking 
by the Supreme Court, 83 Yale. L. J. 1202, 1210-1222 (1974).  Black 
repeated this entire passage in McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210-211, Torcaso, 
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Repudiating the claim that his decisions manifested 
hostility to religion, he wrote that “the First Amendment 
rests upon the premise that both religion and government 
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left 
free from the other within its respective sphere.”231  He 
rejected the requirement that a Notary Public profess a 
belief in God, because “The power and authority of the 
State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular 
sort of believers-those who are willing to say they believe 
in ‘the existence of God.’” 232  He then quoted an earlier 
opinion:  “we have staked the very existence of our country 
on the faith that complete separation between the state and 
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”233  
He cited the old theme that establishment breeds hypocrisy, 
arguing that the rule followed “the historically and 
constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious 
beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons 
who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a 
belief in some particular kind of religious concept.”234  
The school prayer decision declared that “the 
                                                                                                                                                 
367 U.S. at 492-93, and his dissent in Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 
236, 250-51 (1968). 
231 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212. 
232 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490. 
233 Id. at 494, quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring), which in turn was quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
234 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 494. 
 88
constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an 
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this 
country it is no part of the business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried 
on by government.”235  Disestablishment meant that “the 
people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures 
of government for change each time a new political 
administration is elected to office.”236   The Establishment 
Clause, Black claimed, “was written to quiet well-justified 
fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an 
awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's 
tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that 
government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God 
that government wanted them to pray to.”237 
Recent scholarship has emphasized Black’s suspicion of 
the Catholic church, and his early involvement in the Ku 
Klux Klan, as evidence that modern Establishment Clause 
doctrine is contaminated with bias.238  Yet the more 
important factor in explaining his approach to the 
                                                 
235 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. 
236 Id. at 430. 
237 Id. at 435. 
238 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 422-34, 461-63; John T. McGreevy, 
Catholicism and American Freedom:  A History 184-86 (2003); Thomas C. 
Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. 
Chi. L.J. 121, 127-29 (2001).  A different psychological explanation is 
offered by Noah Feldman, who speculates that Black was reacting to the 
atrocities of World War II.  Feldman, supra note 15, at 173-75. 
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Establishment Clause is that he was raised a Baptist.  By 
the time he wrote Engel, he was no longer formally 
affiliated with any church239 – he told his son, “I cannot 
believe.  But I can’t not believe either.”240 – but he 
continued to hold a typically Baptist view of the 
corrupting effects of establishment.241  The corruption 
claim, as he states it in the passages just quoted, could 
have been written by Backus or Leland. 
A much shrewder critique of Black was offered 
immediately after Everson and McCollum by the Catholic 
theologian John Courtney Murray.  Murray argued that the 
idea of separation that underlay these decisions depended 
on “a particular sectarian concept of ‘religion.’”242  The 
idea that religion is a fundamentally private and 
individual matter, one that can never be expressed in 
communal ritual, depends, Murray argued, on “a deistic 
version of fundamentalist Protestantism.”243  The idea of an 
absolute ban on assistance to religion “even in the 
                                                 
239 He occasionally attended services at a Unitarian church.  Newman, 
supra note 223, at 521. 
240 See Black, supra note 224, at 172. 
241 He also had a typically Baptist view of the primacy of individual 
conscience, as in his opinion for a plurality in Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), in which he held that even those who did 
not believe in God could claim a religious exemption from the draft.  
He wrote that the law “exempts from military service all those whose 
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious 
beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to 
become a part of an instrument of war.”  Id. at 344. 
242 Murray, supra note 3, at 29. 
243 Id. at 31. 
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demonstrable absence of any coercion of conscience, any 
inhibition of full religious liberty, any violation of 
civil equality, any disruption of social harmony”244 cannot 
be sustained without this religious premise, he thought.  
Responding to Justice Rutledge’s claim that separation “is 
best for the state and best for religion,”245 he asked:  “by 
what constitutional authority is the Supreme Court 
empowered to legislate as to what is ‘best for religion’?  
I thought church and state were separated here.”246 
Murray was on shakier ground when he claimed that 
“Madison’s radically individualistic concept of religion” 
was “today quite passé.”247  In fact, as we have seen, the 
individualistic premise was pervasive in the thought of the 
founding period.   
The problem about the religious roots of the 
corruption argument is nonetheless a pressing one, and for 
just the reason that Murray notes.  A rule against 
establishment of religion ought not itself to establish a 
religion.  The point is a powerful one, and it is 
remarkable that so little has been made of it since Murray 
wrote.   
 
                                                 
244 Id. at 30. 
245 Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
246 Murray, supra note 3, at 30 n.33. 
247 Id. at 29 n.29. 
 91
IV.  The troublesome religious roots 
 
Now that we have examined the argument for corruption 
as it was deployed by the founding generation, we can ask 
whether any of this matters for contemporary constitutional 
interpretation.  It is clear that the corruption argument 
mattered to the framers, and that they thought that 
preventing corruption of religion was one of the purposes 
of barring establishments of religion.  Can that offer us 
any guidance in interpreting the clause today? 
 The role of original meaning is contested in 
constitutional law.  But it’s generally agreed that, when a 
provision is aimed at a specific historical evil, the 
provision should be read as preventing a recurrence of that 
evil or others relevantly like it.  Of course, there is 
room for disagreement as to what counts as other evils 
relevantly like it.  For that, we have to look at what the 
problem is and offer an account of why it makes sense to 
remedy it.  For such an account, the original meaning won’t 
help us.  The prohibition rarely arrives with a rule for 
its interpretation, and often the framers had no specific 
interpretive rule in mind.248  When the authors of the first 
                                                 
248 Thus, for example, Leonard Levy has shown that, at the time of the 
framing of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, neither James 
Madison nor anyone else had figured out that the protection of free 
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amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry notes, 
“they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a 
definition of a system.”249 
 Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional 
interpretation is frequently guided by paradigm cases, 
which are specific core commitments that are memorialized 
by the constitutional provisions.  An example is the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Amendment’s language is broad, 
but it was enacted specifically in order to outlaw the 
Black Codes – laws enacted by white-controlled legislatures 
after the Civil War, that imposed specific legal 
disabilities on blacks, such as requiring them to be 
gainfully employed under contacts of long duration, 
excluding them from occupations other than manual labor, 
and disabling them from testifying against whites in 
court.250  Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment must invalidate the Black Codes.  More generally, 
any interpretation that specifies the more general types of 
inequality that the Amendment forbids must be a chain of 
                                                                                                                                                 
speech must prevent the state from punishing seditious libel, even 
though this core meaning of the Clause would shortly be argued by 
Madison in his critique of the Sedition Act a few years later.  Leonard 
W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985). 
249 See Curry, supra note 52, at 211.  The Court has similarly observed 
that the purpose of the Framers of the First Amendment “was to state an 
objective, not to write a statute.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
668 (1970). 
250 See Theodore Brantner Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (1965). 
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inferences from the core commitment represented by the 
paradigm case.251 
 Similarly with other constitutional provisions that 
are aimed at specific evils.  The Fourth Amendment’s ban on 
unreasonable searches and seizures should be read in light 
of the controversies over general searches and writs of 
assistance before the American Revolution.252  The contract 
clause should be read as a response to debtor relief 
legislation in the 1780s.253  If original meaning is to 
count at all, then a constitutional provision must be 
understood to address the very problem that it was designed 
to address. 
Unless it states a specific rule, it must also be 
understood to stand for some principle.  That principle 
must be a principle that addresses the very problem that 
the provision was designed to address.  But it cannot 
simply be a rule that addresses that problem and nothing 
more.  If the framers had intended to do that, they could 
have said so, and they didn’t. 
                                                 
251 Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time:  A Theory of Constitutional Self-
Government 178-195 (2001).  The idea that constitutional provisions 
should be interpreted in light of paradigm cases is, of course, hardly 
original with Rubenfeld; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and 
the Religion Clauses, 4 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 683, 690 
(1990); but Rubenfeld lays out the argument with unusual clarity and 
detail. 
252 Jed Rubenfeld, Revolution By Judiciary:  The Structure of American 
Constitutional Law 32-33 (2005). 
253 Laycock, supra note 251, at 690. 
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 The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt 
candidate for paradigm case interpretation, since the core 
historical wrong that is intended to be barred – here, an 
establishment of religion, of the kind that existed in 
England – is specifically named in the text.254   
 Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by “extrapolating 
general principles from the foundational paradigm cases and 
applying those principles to the controversy at hand.”255  
With respect to provisions such as the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which prohibit certain government actions, the 
general principle should give a convincing account of the 
result in the paradigm case while at the same time properly 
specifying the kind of evil that the prohibition reaches.  
The principle should explain what kind of wrong the 
provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent 
controversies, it is possible to tell whether the same kind 
of wrong is or is not occurring. 
In Establishment Clause cases, then, to the extent 
that one wants to rely on original meaning – and I am by no 
means suggesting that this should be the sole source of 
constitutional law256 – one should ask, (1) why did the 
                                                 
254 Rubenfeld briefly discusses the interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause in Rubenfeld, supra note 252, at 29-30. 
255 See Rubenfeld, supra note 251, at 191. 
256 In fact, original meaning is more conventionally taken to be one of 
several sources of constitutional meaning, along with text, precedent, 
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framers think establishment of religion is a bad thing, and 
(2) is the same bad thing brought about by the challenged 
action in this case?  There will obviously be room for 
disagreement about both of these issues.  The paradigm case 
method does not decide cases, but it makes clear which 
questions the judges should ask. 
With respect to the first question, why the framers 
thought establishment was a bad thing, the corruption 
argument is indisputably relevant.  It was only one of the 
reasons why establishment was thought bad, but it was a 
consideration that played an important role, and so the 
clause should be read in light of it. 
At the same time, the original argument for corruption 
cannot be used today without modification.  In that 
original form, it is crucially dependent on Protestant or 
Deist premises.  Today, Deism has disappeared, and the 
largest religious denomination in the United States is 
Catholicism.257  More generally, an interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause that relies on specific, contested 
theological premises is inconsistent with the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                 
and much else.  The classic catalogue of sources of Constitutional Law 
is Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:  Theory of the Constitution 
(1982). 
257 This is why modern defenders of nonestablishment cannot simply invoke 
the original religious arguments to defend their position.  See, e.g., 
Marci A. Hamilton and Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of 
Disestablishment Principles, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1755 (2006). 
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the Clause.  The trouble is that the corruption argument 
has a paradoxical and potentially self-nullifying quality:  
the corruption claim can always be applied to the 
understanding of religion that is the basis for any 
specific corruption claim.  So in order to be usable now, 
the argument will need some translation. 
 To begin this exercise in reconstruction, let us 
enumerate the recurring claims that fall under the rubric 
of “corruption.” 
 
A.  The claims distilled 
 
  Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of 
religious value.  From this premise some, but hardly all, 
commentators have inferred that the religion that the state 
can promote is likely to be worthless. The idea that 
religious sincerity is crucial to salvation, and that one 
should follow one’s own conscientious beliefs even in the 
teeth of contrary religious authority, was endorsed as 
early as Pope Innocent III (1198-1216):  “One ought to 
endure excommunication rather than sin  . . . no one ought 
to act against his own conscience and he should follow his 
conscience rather than the judgment of the church when he 
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is certain . . . one ought to suffer any evil rather than 
sin against conscience.”258  Noah Feldman observes that the 
idea of freedom of conscience is already being suggested by 
this kind of argument:  “If it was sinful to act against 
conscience, then there might be reason to avoid requiring 
anyone to act against conscience.”259  But here it is only 
inchoate.  Aquinas, who held basically the same view as 
Innocent, did not suggest that conscience entailed 
religious toleration.  On the contrary, he supported the 
persecution of heretics.260  The present populations of 
South America and Africa are ample evidence that state 
coercion can eventually bring about many people’s sincere 
adherence to the favored religious belief.  Additional 
premises appear to be necessary in order for this argument 
to be a constraint on state power. 
                                                 
258 Brian Tierney, Religious Rights:  An Historical Perspective, in John 
Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver, Religious Human Rights in Global 
Perspective 25 (1996)(quoting Ordinary Gloss to the Decretals, which 
explained two judgments by Innocent). 
259 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346, 357 (2002). 
260 St. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Political Writings 77-79 (A.P. 
D’Entreves ed. 1981).  There is some tension within this position, 
since the heretic may be exercising his own rational faculties to the 
best of his ability.  Aquinas found it necessary to deny this, and to 
claim that the heretic is willfully denying the truth.  See David 
Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 87-88 (1986).  “Aquinas did 
not make clear whether he believed that a well informed conscience 
could ever be in conflict with ecclesiastical authority.”  Michael G. 
Baylor, Action and Person:  Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the 
Young Luther 57 n.138 (1977).  Contemporary Catholicism takes a very 
different view.  Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom] 
(1965) declares the right of individuals to seek the truth in religious 
matters, even if they follow false religions. 
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 Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal 
divisions.  In fact, a variety of religious positions have 
religious value.  State-induced religious uniformity 
therefore attacks the very value it seeks to promote.  This 
goes beyond Aquinas, because it holds that heresy is not a 
harm against which the state can legitimately protect the 
public.  It may not be a harm at all.  This may be because 
the theological differences at issue are not really that 
important.  Or it may be because the differences that are 
likely to bother the state are unlikely to be the ones that 
matter, or even that the state is likely to promote the 
wrong views, as Milton, Locke, and Madison argued.  It may 
be that false religious views have positive value because 
engagement with them brings us closer to the truth, as 
Milton, Pufendorf, and Jefferson thought.  This claim also 
supports the next argument: 
 The state is an unreliable source of religious 
authority.  In part this follows from the above.  To those 
who have been on the losing side of state-imposed 
uniformity, it is also an inference from experience.  Note, 
however, that since the corruption argument is itself 
religious, it has inherent limits:  the state evidently is 
not so unreliable that it cannot discern religious value 
when that value is described at this level of abstraction.  
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In order to make any use at all of the corruption argument, 
the state must be competent to say what is religious. 
 Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a 
pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state.  
This can be derived from theological premises, as in Roger 
Williams.  It may also be an inference from experience, but 
if it is, it presupposes some idea of what it means for a 
change in religion to be pernicious.  That idea cannot be 
religiously neutral. 
 Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt 
toward religion.  This, too, is an inference from 
experience. 
 The legitimate authority of the state does not extend 
to religious questions.  This can be derived from a kind of 
social contract argument, and Locke so derived it, in an 
argument independent of his theological arguments.  But it 
also follows from the above. 
 All of these arguments depend on some conception of 
the good of religion which is being promoted by the 
corruption argument.  What could such a conception look 
like today?  It’s clear what it can’t be:  an unmediated 
connection with God arrived at through personal study of 
the New Testament, as Milton and Elisha Williams wrote and 
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many of the other writers we have surveyed may have 
thought.  What could take its place? 
 
B.  Scalia’s reformulation 
 
 As Jared Goldstein has observed, a rule that the state 
may not examine the merits of religious practices and 
beliefs depends on the premise that the state can tell what 
religion is.  Otherwise, it is impossible to follow the 
rule.261  But the discernment of what religion is itself 
appears to present a religious question.  The problem 
becomes more acute once it is noted that the corruption 
argument depends on the premise that religion is a good 
thing.  Then we have to ask, what is this good thing?  Is 
it possible to answer that question without committing 
oneself on controversial religious questions? 
Larry Alexander argues that, if religion is accommodated 
because it is a good thing, then one should only 
accommodate the true religion.  If duties to God have 
                                                 
261 Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine?  
Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 
Catholic U. L. Rev. 497 (2005).   The same analytic point is made in 
another context by David Strauss, who shows that a color-blindness rule 
is necessarily intensely race-conscious.  The Myth of Colorblindness, 
1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199.  For engagement with Goldstein’s arguments, see 
Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious 
Neutrality, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 
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priority over duties to the state, this priority only holds 
with respect to real rather than imagined duties to God. In 
order to apply this rationale, the state would have to 
decide what the true religion is and to exempt only that 
religion’s believers from generally applicable laws.262  In 
the context of the corruption argument, a variation on 
Alexander’s claim would be that the state should figure out 
which religious beliefs fell within the range of 
neighboring differences that had religious value, and then 
keep its hands off only those beliefs.  That was the 
position of all of those proponents of disestablishment who 
drew the line at certain religious beliefs that they 
thought were obviously false and destructive, such as 
atheism or Catholicism.263 
Something like this formulation has been proposed by 
Justice Antonin Scalia.  He offers his approach as a 
solution to the free exercise/establishment dilemma. “We 
have not yet come close to reconciling [the requirement 
that government not advance religion] and our Free Exercise 
cases, and typically we do not really try.”264  The solution 
                                                 
262 See Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and 
Impossibility of a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 
47 Drake L. Rev. 35 (1998). 
263 See Milton, supra note 54, at 747; Locke, supra note 94, at 50; 
Williams, supra note 108, at 93. 
264 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987)(Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
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he, Justice Thomas, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist 
have proposed would impose dramatic limits upon the 
Establishment Clause.  They would read the Clause only to 
prohibit favoritism among sects, while permitting states to 
favor religion over irreligion. Of this group, Scalia has 
offered the clearest formulation of the alternative rule: 
“our constitutional tradition . . . ruled out of order 
government-sponsored endorsement of religion  . . . where 
the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying 
details upon which men and women who believe in a 
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are 
known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ.)"265  
More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU,266 
dissenting from a decision barring one ceremonial display 
of the Ten Commandments, he frankly acknowledged that 
ceremonial theism would entail “contradicting the beliefs 
of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the 
gods pay no attention to human affairs.”267  The 
Commandments “are assuredly a religious symbol, but they 
are not so closely associated with a single religious 
belief that their display can reasonably be understood as 
preferring one religious sect over another. The Ten 
                                                 
265 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
266 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
267 Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., 
dissenting).   
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Commandments are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam alike as divinely given.”268  Justice Stevens objected 
that “[t]here are many distinctive versions of the 
Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even 
different denominations within a particular faith; to a 
pious and learned observer, these differences may be of 
enormous religious significance.”269   Scalia (here joined 
by Rehnquist, Thomas, and Kennedy) retorted that “The 
sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely 
known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware 
that there are competing versions with doctrinal 
consequences (I certainly was not).”270  Justice Scalia thus 
envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which 
articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be 
eligible for state endorsement (and in which determinedly 
uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of law!).  
Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition 
so long as that proposition is (or is believed by a judge 
unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be) a matter of 
                                                 
268 Id. at 909.  There is a delicious ambiguity, which I won’t pursue 
further here, about what it means to be “associated with a single 
religious belief.”  If the Ten Commandments are not so associated, then 
neither is the divinity of Christ, since Protestants and Catholics who 
violently disagree on many religious issues are nonetheless in 
agreement about that. 
269 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005)(Stevens, J., 
dissenting), citing Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 
Const. Commentary 471, 474-476 (Fall 1998). 
270 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 909 n. 12 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  It 
would, for instance, be permissible for the state to 
declare that Gabriel is one of the most important 
archangels.  The interpretation of the establishment clause 
would then depend on the further development of the Moslem 
idea of the People of the Book – those who have received a 
revelation that is deemed (formerly by the Koran, now by 
the Supreme Court) to be reliably from God. 
Like Backus or Adams, Scalia’s vision of state 
incompetence is limited only to certain theological 
propositions.  The state must not adjudicate the divinity 
of Christ.  But it is only disagreement among monotheists 
that the state must keep its hands off.  It can 
authoritatively and reliably pronounce its views on the 
question of theism.271 
Scalia’s solution will not work, because it 
discriminates among religions.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
thought that the establishment clause forbids “asserting a 
preference for one religious denomination or sect over 
                                                 
271 For a similar criticism of the nonpreferentialist position, see Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-18 (1992)(Souter, J., concurring).  A 
defender of Scalia might say that there is a difference between saying 
that the state can discern the broadest religious truths (probably 
Locke’s position about atheism) and saying (as Scalia does) that the 
state can discern a consensus or historical tradition and act to 
reflect the consensus view.  As the development of Scalia’s position 
makes clear, this distinction is unsustainable in practice.  
“Acknowledgement” easily slides into endorsement.  Thanks to Kent 
Greenawalt for pressing me on this point. 
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others.”272  Scalia once agreed:  “I have always believed, 
and all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion 
over others.”273  Not all religions involve a belief in “a 
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world.”274  
Scalia’s formulation does discriminate among religions.  
Christians, Jews, and Moslems are in; Hindus, Buddhists, 
and atheists are out.  And the outs are a lot of people.  
Justice Scalia defended his approach by noting that the 
monotheistic religions “combined account for 97.7% of all 
believers.”275  But he’s fudging the numbers:  in 
calculating the level of exclusion here, nonbelievers are 
doubly excluded, since they are not even entitled to be 
part of the denominator.  If one adds the nonbelievers, as 
enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United 
                                                 
272 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
273 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 
(1994)(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
274 The Court held long ago that the Establishment Clause forbids 
government to “aid those religions based on a belief in the existence 
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”  
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The Court noted that 
“[a]mong religions in this country, which do not teach what would 
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, 
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”  Ibid. at 495 
n.11. To say that Buddhism rejects theism is something of an 
overstatement. While the historical Buddha had no interest in 
theological questions, some forms of Buddhism make theological claims, 
sometimes assigning divine status to Buddha himself. For a general 
overview of these issues, see Masao Abe, Buddhism, in Arvind Sharma 
ed., Our Religions 69-137 (1993). Hinduism is only the most prominent 
of many polytheistic religions.  There are, concededly, monotheistic 
interpretations of Hinduism, but not all Hindus subscribe to these. 
275 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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States which Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is 
33 million out of 207 million, or 16 percent.276 
The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than 
the Statistical Abstract suggests.  The proportion of 
Americans who report having no religious preference doubled 
in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its 
level for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998.  However, 
most of the members of this category are in fact religious.  
More than half believe in God, more than half believe in 
life after death, about a third believe in heaven and hell, 
and 93 percent sometimes pray.  The most careful study of 
this group concludes that the newer members of this group 
are mostly “unchurched believers” who declare no religious 
preference in an effort to express their distance from the 
Religious Right.277 
It is pretty clear that these people are not 
interested in being part of the theistic triumphalism that 
Scalia wants to license.  Similarly, Steven Gey observes 
that, in order to calculate the number of people excluded 
                                                 
276 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-
2005 (124th ed. 2004), at 55; cited in id.  Further data on the number 
of people Scalia is leaving out are compiled in Frederick Mark Gedicks 
and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion:  Judeo-Christianity and the Ten 
Commandments, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 275, 284-85 (2007).  The data on which 
the Census Bureau relies is described in detail in Barry A. Kosmin and 
Ariela Keysar, Religion in a Free Market (2006). 
277 Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No 
Religious Preference:  Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Sociological 
Rev. 165 (2002). 
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from Scalia’s formula, one ought also to include the large 
number of theists who reject state sponsorship of religion, 
including “[t]raditional Roger Williams-style Baptists, 
Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews, 
many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist 
Protestants.”278  Scalia does not explain his indifference 
to these people while he conspicuously includes Jews and 
Moslems, who together comprise fewer than 4 million 
Americans.279 
Scalia’s position is essentially that the state may take 
one side in the modern culture wars, in favor of 
traditionalists and against modernists.  It may not be 
irrelevant that the traditionalists have become an 
important constituency of the Republican party.280  This 
kind of religious division, with the coercive power of the 
                                                 
278 Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 20 (2007). 
279 As Gey notes, most Jews are separationists who aren’t interested in 
being included in Scalia’s numerator. 
280 See Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide:  Religious and Cultural 
Conflict in American Party Politics (2001); Wuthnow, supra note 33, at 
218-22.  The effect has become more pronounced over time.  In the 2004 
presidential election, those attending church more than once a week 
voted for Bush by a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent, while those who 
never attend church were almost the inverse:  36 percent to 62 percent.  
Among Orthodox Jews, 69 percent voted for Bush, while Conservative Jews 
gave him 23 percent and Reform Jews 15 percent.  Bush won 40 percent of 
the votes of Jews attending synagogue on a weekly basis, compared to 18 
percent of those who rarely or never attend.  Jay Lefkowitz, The 
Election and the Jewish Vote, Commentary, Feb. 2005, at 61. 
It may also be relevant that the “originalist” credentials of 
Scalia’s position are deeply flawed, suggesting that he is basing his 
position on something other than the intentions of the framers.  See 
Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, Nw. 
U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 
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state as the prize for which the religious factions 
struggle, is one of the central evils that the religion 
clauses aim at preventing.  One may also wonder why he 
thinks that the state’s competence extends to this 
particular set of religious question, when he concedes its 
incompetence with respect to so many others. 
Perhaps Scalia’s central concern is to promote a certain 
kind of civic unity which recognition of religion makes 
possible.  This is clearest in his dissent from a decision 
invalidating a high school graduation prayer: 
The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome 
potential of sectarian religious belief to generate 
civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew 
that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to 
foster among religious believers of various faiths a 
toleration-- no, an affection--for one another than 
voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God 
whom they all worship and seek. Needless to say, no 
one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame 
to deprive our public culture of the opportunity, and 
indeed the encouragement, for people to do it 
voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard and 
joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi 
Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was 
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inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a 
manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our 
society of that important unifying mechanism, in order 
to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal 
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in 
respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy 
as it is unsupported in law.281 
Social unity, he evidently thinks, depends on shared norms. 
The problem with his prescription of official 
monotheism is that Baptists and Catholics and Jews can 
indeed be part of the overlapping consensus he 
contemplates, but we live in a society that also includes 
millions who aren’t monotheists.  Charles Taylor’s point 
about the limitations of a common ground strategy are 
salient here.  If the aim is shared agreement, then it is 
counterproductive to propose unifying principles that large 
numbers of citizens cannot possibly agree to.  The size of 
the remainder matters.   Perhaps Scalia’s solution made 
sense in the 1950s, when the idea of a “Judeo-Christian” 
overlapping consensus was invented,282 but it is no longer 
appropriate in contemporary American society.283  
                                                 
281 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
282 See Silk, supra note 215, at 40-53. 
283 See generally Gedicks and Hendrix, supra note 276. 
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Overlapping consensus is unstable and constantly under 
construction. 
 Scalia is right about the importance of shared norms.  
A sense of solidarity is indispensable to democracy:  if 
majorities are to rule legitimately, then the losers need 
to feel that they have some stake in the system.  A sense 
of solidarity is also necessary to a functioning welfare 
state.  The split between American liberals and the 
religious has greatly truncated the possibilities for a 
transformative left politics.284 
As the common ground shrinks, however, its basis must 
become more abstract and vague.  Christianity will no 
longer do the job.  Neither will monotheism.  But the idea 
that religion is something of value, and that that value is 
jeopardized when religious questions are adjudicated by the 
state, may continue to provide the common ground that is 
needed. 
The pluralism we now face was not imagined by the 
framers.  It is therefore impossible to attribute to them 
any view about it.  Protestant Christianity was so 
pervasive in their culture that they did not even consider 
whether its establishment was inconsistent with religious 
                                                 
284 See Garry Wills, Under God:  Religion and American Politics (1990). 
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liberty.285  Modern religious pluralism has generated new 
knowledge about the range of religious issues that are 
potentially subject to corruption by state interference. 
 
V.  A proposal 
 
A.  Defining religion 
 
 What, then, is the “religion” that the state must keep 
its hands off? 
Religion is a category that is hard to delimit.286  The 
best treatments of the problem of defining “religion” for 
constitutional purposes, most prominently that of Kent 
Greenawalt, have concluded that no dictionary definition 
will do, because no single feature unites all the things 
that are indisputably religions. Religions just have a 
“family resemblance” to one another. In doubtful cases, one 
                                                 
285 Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:  A False Claim 
About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 918-19 (1986); Curry, 
supra note 52, at 218, 221. 
286 Many writers have tried to evade this problem by saying that what is 
to be protected is not religion, but conscience.  The reasons why this 
stratagem will not work are explored in Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, 
Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions (unpublished ms.). 
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can only ask how close the analogy is between a putative 
instance of religion and the indisputable instances.287 
This process need not yield indeterminacy.  The concept 
of “family resemblance” is drawn from the philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously argued that “the meaning 
of a word is its use in the language.”288  Thus, for 
example, there is no single thing common to “games” which 
makes them all games, but “similarities, relationships, and 
a whole series of them at that.”289  The use of the word 
“game” is thus not circumscribed by any clear rule.  But 
that does not mean that it is not circumscribed at all.  
“[N]o more are there any rules for how high one throws the 
ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all 
of that and has rules too.”290 
                                                 
287 See William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 142 
(Paul Edwards ed. 1967); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for 
the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983); 
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. 
L. Rev. 753 (1984); Tribe, supra note 23, at 1181-83; Eduardo Peñalver, 
Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 Yale L.J. 791 (1997); Greenawalt, 
supra note 39, at 124-156; Koppelman, supra note 6, at 125-139.  Courts 
in Europe have done no better in devising a definition.  Rex Ahdar and 
Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26 (2005).  Lest 
one think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an 
artifact of academic preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is 
also used by that singularly hardheaded entity, the Internal Revenue 
Service.  See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 Tax 
Mgm’t & Port. (BNA) III (2007). 
288 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
289 Id. at 31. 
290 Id. at 33. 
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Explaining Wittgenstein’s idea here, Charles Taylor 
observes that, with respect to a great many rule-guided 
social practices, 
the “rule” lies essentially in the practice.  The rule 
is what is animating the practice at any given time, and 
not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our 
thoughts or our brains or our genes, or whatever.  
That’s why the rule is, at any time, what the practice 
has made it.291 
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus, 
for instance, are not codified anywhere.  But natives of 
the culture may understand quite well what they are, and 
there may be no doubt at all as to how they apply in 
particular cases, even if they have not been codified and 
could not be codified.292 
 The definition of religion in American law appears to 
work just this way.  There is no set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that will make something a 
“religion.”  But it is remarkable how few cases have arisen 
                                                 
291 Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule, in Philosophical Arguments 178 
(1995). 
292 See Al Yankovic, Another One Rides the Bus (Placebo Records 1981). 
 As Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term “religion” denotes an 
anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice 
of encountering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated 
with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to deal.  
Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies 
269 (Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998).  Arising thus out of a specific 
historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, 
“religion” would be surprising if it had any essential denotation. 
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in which courts have had real difficulty in determining 
whether something is a religion or not.293 
In the context of the hands-off rule, religion should be 
understood by reference to a set of ultimate questions that 
the state must not try to answer.  But the state can 
recognize and promote the good of religion, understood at a 
certain level of abstraction.  Neutrality is fluid; it is 
available in many specifications.294  The American approach 
is one defensible specification.  The state is agnostic 
about religion, but it is an interested and sympathetic 
agnosticism.  The state does not say “I don’t know and you 
don’t either.”  Rather it declares the value of religion in 
a carefully noncommittal way:  “It would be good to find 
out.  And we encourage your efforts to do that.” 
The precise character of the good being promoted is 
itself deliberately left vague, because the broad consensus 
on freedom of religion would surely collapse if we had to 
state with specificity the value promoted by religion.  
“Religion” denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation 
                                                 
293 The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of 
“religion” is a remarkably short one.  See Religion, 36C Words and 
Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008).  A recent survey laments the 
absence of a clear definition, but offers no evidence that the courts 
have had any trouble deciding cases as a result.  Jeffrey L. Oldham, 
Note, Constitutional “Religion”:  A Survey of First Amendment 
Definitions of Religion, 6 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 117 (2001). 
294 See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF POLITICS 
633 (2004). 
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(if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the 
transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),295 
responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of 
human life (if it is imperfect),296 courage in the face of 
the heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind 
of encouragement helps),297 a transcendent underpinning for 
the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning 
helps),298 contact with that which is awesome and 
indescribable (if awe is something you feel),299 and many 
others.  No general description of the good that religion 
seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or 
intellectually.300  The establishment clause permits the 
state to favor religion so long as “religion” is understood 
very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference 
among religions or religious propositions.  
                                                 
295 John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980). 
296 Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction 
17-34 (1999). 
297 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952). 
298 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone (1794; New York:  Harper, 1960). 
299 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (2d ed. 1950). 
300 Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of 
religion: 
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be 
established.  I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful 
élans and aspirations which humans have manifested in the 
spiritual realm, and relate them to some single set of underlying 
needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning 
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baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would 
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Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 679 (2007). 
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This understanding makes it possible to defend 
accommodations without running into the free 
exercise/establishment dilemma.  The state is recognizing 
the value of religion, but it is making no claims about 
religious truth.  It is the making of such claims that 
violates the establishment clause. 
This understanding also provides a basis for the hands 
off rule.  Each of these understandings of the good of 
religion is manipulable for political purposes.  Each is 
likely to be abused.  There is no reason to trust the state 
to resolve religious questions.  The incompetence and 
futility extend to the deepest religious divisions today. 
Recall the basic elements of the claim that 
establishment corrupts religion.  
 Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of 
religious value.  Each of the understandings of the good of 
religion that I have described at least has a personal 
dimension, even if it also has communal aspects.  So 
hypocrisy is a ubiquitous worry, and state efforts to nudge 
citizens toward a particular religious view conduces to 
hypocrisy.  Of course the nudge may be gentle, and if it is 
gentle enough, it is unlikely to produce this particular 
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pathology and may be quite effective.301  So this argument 
needs supplementation if it is to support as broad a hands-
off rule as the Court has adopted. 
 Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal 
divisions.  In fact, a variety of religious positions have 
religious value.  This follows from the premise that 
everything in the cluster should be treated as 
participating in the value of religion.  The cluster 
conception of religion is essentially pluralistic.  Some 
religions reject this premise, of course.  But their 
adherents may nonetheless be persuaded that religious 
liberty will be more secure if the state is required to act 
as though this premise were true. 
 The state is an unreliable source of religious 
authority.   
 Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a 
pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state.   
 Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt 
toward religion.   
All of these may be treated as inferences from 
experience.  The most notable datum that has presented 
itself since the framing is the frequently noted fact that 
                                                 
301 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:  Solving the Sticky 
Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (2000). 
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in Europe, with its established churches, religion is 
withering away; in the United States, it is thriving.302  
One may also note the unattractive ways in which religion 
is transformed when the state tries to embrace it in a 
politically acceptable way.  Steven Goldberg’s book 
Bleached Faith does this in some detail, noting that when 
the state displays the Ten Commandments, it typically does 
so in forms that deprive it of any meaning; that the 
movement to teach “intelligent design” in the schools 
demotes God to the status of a second-rate engineer of 
biological minutiae; that the promotion of Christmas 
produces a bland, commercialized Christianity while 
distorting the place of Hanukkah in the Jewish calendar.303  
These examples have limited power, because they will move 
some people more than others.  All the argument needs in 
order to be effective, however, is that audiences be able 
to think of some illustrations of these propositions. 
 The legitimate authority of the state does not extend 
to religious questions.  This follows from all of the 
above.  It entails a hands-off rule with respect to 
theological questions. 
                                                 
302 See Casanova, supra note 209. 
303 Goldberg, supra note 209. 
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 Implicit in the hands off rule is something analogous 
to the civil religion that Robert Bellah has observed is 
implicit in American practice.  Bellah observes that there 
are “certain common elements of religious orientation that 
the great majority of Americans share” and that “provide a 
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, 
including the political sphere.”304  This orientation, which 
he labeled “the American civil religion,”305 included as its 
tenets “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward 
of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of 
religious intolerance.”306  This civil religion does not, 
however, include such controversial matters as the divinity 
of Jesus Christ.  “The God of the civil religion is not 
only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side, 
much more related to order, law, and right than to 
salvation and love.”307 
 Robert Wuthnow observes that the American civil 
religion described by Bellah has been fragmenting in recent 
years into two very different visions.308  A conservative 
narrative holds that America’s government is legitimate 
because it reflects biblical principles and has the 
                                                 
304 Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in Beyond Belief:  
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World 171 (1970). 
305 Id. 
306 Id. at 172. 
307 Id. at 175. 
308 See Wuthnow, supra note 33, at 241-67. 
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potential to evangelize the world.  A liberal narrative 
holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast 
resources to alleviate the material problems that face the 
world.  In this liberal narrative, “[f]aith plays a role 
chiefly as a motivating element, supplying strength to keep 
going against what often appear as insuperable odds.”309  
The two visions have become increasingly hostile to one 
another.  As a consequence, neither can effectively claim 
to speak for common American values. 
 The civil religion implied by the hands off rule 
cannot by itself provide such common values.  But neither 
does it preclude them.  It is even more abstract than 
Bellah’s Unitarian civic God.  It is a negative God, a God 
without predicates.310  The hands off rule reveals its 
reverence for the Absolute by omitting all reference to it 
in public decisionmaking.  The aspiration should be for an 
eloquent silence, like a rest in music. 
 
B.  The shaping of modern religion 
 
 The usefulness of an exceedingly abstract conception 
of the value of religion is reinforced by the recent work 
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of Charles Taylor on the history and character of modern 
secularity.  Taylor argues that the emergence of a world in 
which religiosity is one option among others has roots in 
Christian theology.  From this he infers that the gap 
between religiosity and secularism is less profound than 
many think; “both emerge from the same long process of 
Reform in Latin Christendom.”311 
 In the primitive world of nature rituals and tribal 
deities, there was no clear distinction between the 
immanent and the transcendent.  The sense of cosmic order 
pervaded everything.  The individual was deeply embedded in 
this world; there were no clear boundaries between self and 
nonself, personal agency and impersonal force.  Possession 
by demons was a real and terrifying possibility.  In such 
circumstances, unbelief was literally unthinkable.312 
 Around the middle of the first millennium B.C., the 
great world faiths appeared.  (Following Karl Jaspers, 
Taylor calls this moment the “Axial Revolution.”)  
Confucius, Lao-tse, Siddhartha Gautama, the Hebrew 
prophets, Socrates, and Plato brought new visions of 
universal ethics and individual salvation.  A new line was 
drawn between sacred and profane.  A world that had been 
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unified was now divided between the disordered lower realm 
and the higher aspiration toward which individuals were to 
strive.313  The new imperative toward moral improvement 
produced what Taylor calls “the Great Disembedding,” in 
which the individual was separated from his social and 
cosmic environments, and Western individualism began. 
Taylor focuses on the evolution of the Christian 
world.  From the beginning, he argues, there was a tension 
in Christianity between salvation for all, promised by a 
transcendent God, and the pagan practices and habits of 
mind that persisted among the laity.314  The movement that 
culminated in the Reformation began in the middle ages.  
After the Hildebrandine Reform of the eleventh century, 
there were repeated efforts by the Church, first to reform 
its own practices, and later to restrain as idolatrous the 
veneration of saints and relics, magic, miracle-mongering, 
and dancing around the maypole.315  The idea gradually took 
hold that everyone, not only the clergy, could practice the 
virtues of the Gospel.  Ordinary life, including work, 
play, and sex, began to take on sacred meaning.316 
                                                 
313 Id. at 151-53. 
314 Id. at 61-75. 
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  The Christian virtues were no longer those of 
ascetic monks; an ethos of personal responsibility and 
self-discipline became available to everyone.  This attempt 
to bring Christ into the previously unhallowed world 
inspired a new focus on the world.317  Human beings now had 
to inhabit the world “as agents of instrumental reason, 
working the system effectively in order to bring about 
God’s purposes; because it is through these purposes, and 
not through signs, that God reveals himself in his 
world.”318 
This disengaged stance toward a disenchanted world 
became the moral basis of the new scientific method.  
Technological control of the world became yet another way 
of doing God’s work, benefiting the human race in 
accordance with His plan.319  The highest goal was 
understood to be “a certain kind of human flourishing, in a 
context of mutuality, pursuing each his/her happiness on 
the basis of assured life and liberty, in a society of 
mutual benefit.”320 
The this-worldly ethos thus begotten eventually made 
it possible to cut loose from religiosity altogether.  Once 
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“God’s goals for us shrink to the single end of our 
encompassing this order of mutual benefit he has designed 
for us,”321 it is easy for God to drop out of the picture 
completely.  The goal of order becomes simply a matter of 
human flourishing, and the power to pursue that goal is a 
purely human capacity, not something we receive from God.322 
Thus a reforming movement in Christianity was in time 
transformed into militant secularism.  In this new vision, 
the transcendent aspirations of Christianity are a danger 
to the goods of the modern moral order; they risk 
fanaticism and estrangement from our own nature.323  
Religion is suspect because it posits transcendent goals, 
alien to human fulfillment; it is the enemy of human 
fulfillment.  Moreover, the problem of theodicy becomes 
more acute in a world in which the purposes of the world 
are understood to center around human flourishing:  “The 
idea of blaming God gets a clearer sense and becomes much 
more salient in the modern era where people begin to think 
they know just what God was purposing in creating the 
world, and can check the results against the intention.”324 
But the secular world view has discontents of its own, 
manifest in repeated waves of Romantic protest.  It can 
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beget a sense “that something central is missing, some 
great purpose, some élan, some fulfillment, without which 
life has lost its point.”325  It also cannot offer a good 
account of its own commitment to universal benevolence, 
which it cannot disentangle fully from its roots in 
Christian agape.326   
That I am left with human concerns doesn’t tell me to 
take universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it 
tell me that freedom is important, or fulfillment, or 
equality.  Just being confined to human goods could 
just as well find expression in my concerning myself 
exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of 
my family and immediate milieu.  The in fact very 
exigent demands of universal justice and benevolence 
which characterize modern humanism can’t be explained 
just by the subtraction of earlier goals and 
allegiances.327 
The claim that universal benevolence is just part of human 
nature is not especially plausible.  It also can’t account 
for “our sense that there is something higher, nobler, more 
fully human about universal sympathy.”328  It is unclear how 
this benevolence can be sustained in the face of the 
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manifest shortcomings of actual human beings.329  A secular 
world view has notorious problems of its own in dealing 
with the facts of suffering and evil.330  It is because 
secular language finds it difficult to articulate the force 
of ethical demands, or for that matter creative human 
agency and the power of artistic experience, that many 
people find religious language indispensable.331 
The two polar positions, secularism and religious 
belief, are each animated, for many of their adherents, by 
pictures of the world in which the other position is simply 
unimaginable.332  “What pushes us one way or the other is 
what we might describe as our over-all take on human life, 
and its cosmic and (if any) spiritual surroundings.”333  It 
is possible to feel some of the force of each opposing 
position, to stand “in that open space where you can feel 
the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to unbelief,” but 
“this feat is relatively rare.”334 
What is far more common is to occupy some intermediate 
space between the polar positions.335  There has for the 
past few centuries been a growing proliferation of views 
                                                 
329 Id. at 697. 
330 Id. at 680-85. 
331 Id. at 544, 597. 
332 Id. at 549.  “The spin of closure which is hegemonic in the Academy 
is a case in point.”  Id. 
333 Id. at 550. 
334 Id. at 549. 
335 Id. at 512. 
 127
that do this, first among the elite and then later 
generalized to the whole society.336 
[T]he gamut of intermediate positions greatly widens:  
many people drop out of active practice while still 
declaring themselves as belonging to some confession, 
or believing in God.  On another dimension, the gamut 
of beliefs in something beyond widens, fewer declaring 
belief in a personal God, while more hold to something 
like an impersonal force; in other words a wider range 
of people express religious beliefs which move outside 
Christian orthodoxy.  Following in this line is the 
growth of non-Christian religions, particularly those 
originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of 
New Age modes of practice, of views which bridge the 
humanist/spiritual boundary, of practices which link 
spirituality and therapy.  On top of this more and 
more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as 
untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves 
Catholics while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or 
they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray 
while not being certain they believe.337 
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This entire historical movement “has opened a space in 
which people can wander between and around all these 
options without having to land clearly and definitively in 
any one.”338  This, Taylor insists, does not mean simply the 
decline of religion, but at the same time “a new placement 
of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and 
social life.  This new placement is now the occasion for 
recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new 
ways of existing both in and out of relation to God.”339 
Whatever position is held depends on its resonance for 
the individual.  The reforming emphasis on free faith 
inevitably decentralizes; it is contradictory to seek “a 
Church tightly held together by a strong hierarchical 
authority, which will nevertheless be filled with 
practitioners of heartfelt devotion.”340  What matters is 
personal insight, without which external formulas are 
useless.341  The upshot is an ethic of authenticity, in 
which people are encouraged to discover their own way in 
the world, to “do their own thing.”342 
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This complicates any religiously based sense of group 
identity.  It is a particular problem in those regimes, of 
which the United States is a notable example, in which “the 
senses of belonging to group and confession are fused, and 
the moral issues of the group’s history tend to be coded in 
religious categories.”343  It is hard to think of America as 
“one nation under God” when we disagree so radically about 
the nature of God.  At the time the Constitution was 
framed, a society that tried to realize immanent goods was 
understood to be identical with a society obedient to God’s 
will.  Because these have come apart, both sides of today’s 
culture wars can plausibly claim to be effectuating the 
founders’ design.344   
It is nonetheless possible to believe that the 
fragmentation of religions conceals a larger unity.  This 
belief is encapsulated, Taylor observes, in the familiar 
American injunction to worship in the church of your 
choice. 
This supposes that each church doesn’t just operate 
for its own ends, in competition, even hostility to 
others.  There will inevitably be lots of that.  But 
the idea is that there will also be a convergence, a 
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synergy in their ethical effect.  So that together, 
they constitute a wider body, a “church” – or at least 
those of them do which fit within certain tolerable 
limits.345 
Those limits have shifted over time:  Catholics were 
originally outside; by the mid-twentieth century, Jews and 
Catholics were included; the circle has widened again to 
include Muslims.346  “Denominationalism implies that 
churches are all equally options, and thrives best in a 
regime of separation of church and state, de facto if not 
de jure.  But on another level, the political entity can be 
identified with the broader, over-arching ‘church,’ and 
this can be a crucial element in its patriotism.”347   
The lesson I draw from Taylor’s magisterial narrative 
is that religious fragmentation is an irresistible and 
ongoing trend, and that therefore any attempt to define 
communal identity in any but the vaguest terms is a 
prescription for inevitable division.  A persistent theme 
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in all of the classic accounts of corruption that we 
reviewed in Part III was the idea that religion is 
individual, and that state interference distorts it.  
Modern developments have radicalized this individualistic 
tendency, although, as Milton and Roger Williams show, it 
was there from the beginning. 
The broadening of the American civil religion is a 
sensible response to this trend.  There are no longer any 
specific theological propositions that constitute the 
common ground.  Rather, what unites the various religious 
views is a more generalized commitment to the humane 
treatment of every human being, the promotion of a culture 
of nonviolence and mutual respect.348  The state should not 
discriminate among the citizens who share this common 
ground.  Taylor’s account also suggests that religious 
evolution is a delicate process in which the state is 
unlikely to have much to contribute.  The hamhandedness of 
any contemporary intervention is the modern face of 
corrupting establishment.   
 
VI.  Objections  
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 The corruption claim is, as we’ve seen, necessarily 
parasitic on some conception of the good that is allegedly 
being corrupted.  So any claim of corruption of religion 
must be parasitic on a claim about the good of religion – 
or, as we’ve seen, about the cluster of claims that 
constitute that good. 
The persuasiveness of the corruption claim that I have 
formulated here therefore depends on the contingency that 
you, my audience, agree that there is a genuine good in 
what I am trying to protect.  If you think that there is 
some deep and enduring source of value in the cluster of 
ends I’ve described, and you think that the state is likely 
to choose badly if it is called upon to determine the 
relative merits of the ends within the cluster, or of the 
particular avenues by which any of these ends are pursued, 
then you have reason to want the state to define religion 
as a good in precisely the way that I’ve described here.  
And, for the reasons I have given, that will entail, among 
other things, a hands-off rule. 
The argument I have offered gives rise to obvious 
objections.  I will consider three.  First, one might 
object that the conception of “religion” I have offered is 
not specific enough, protecting some activities that are 
worthless.  Second, one might object that it is too 
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specific, unfairly privileging some activities over other 
equally valuable ones.  Finally, one could claim that the 
entire approach is misguided, because it is not appropriate 
to use such a contestable conception of the good as 
“religion,” even defined as capaciously as I have proposed, 
in an argument for any particular deployment of political 
power. 
The first objection has been developed by Timothy 
Macklem.  Recall that Greenawalt and others have argued 
that “religion” should be given its conventional meaning, 
as denoting a set of activities united only by a family 
resemblance, with no set of necessary or sufficient 
conditions demarcating the boundaries of the set.  My 
proposal follows and elaborates Greenawalt’s claim.  
Macklem objects that the question of what “religion” 
conventionally means is a semantic one, but the question of 
what beliefs are entitled to special treatment is a moral 
one, and it requires a moral rather than a semantic 
answer.349   
Macklem’s analytical point is sound.  But there are 
powerful reasons for denying the state the power to judge 
the objective value of particular religions.  Macklem 
himself inadvertently displays those reasons when he 
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proposes that courts undertake "a frank examination of the 
contribution that any doctrine held on the basis of faith, 
be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making 
to well-being."350  In a pluralistic society, there are 
obvious dangers in giving judges the power to assign legal 
consequences to different religious beliefs based on the 
judges' own conceptions of well-being.  Macklem’s own 
confident withholding of protection from “cults” is not 
reassuring.351  The decision to define religion vaguely, 
relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on 
moral grounds.   
David Richards has developed the second objection, 
attacking Greenawalt from the opposite direction by arguing 
that common-sense conceptions of religion “hopelessly track 
often unprincipled and ad hoc majoritarian intuitions of 
‘proper’ or ‘real’ religion.”352  This is a version of the 
corruption argument:  the majoritarian intuitions he 
describes will distort the exercise of the individual 
conscience, which is the truly valuable thing that the 
disestablishment of religion ought to protect.  His 
objection is the same as Macklem’s:  the question of what 
to protect is a moral, not a semantic one.  While Macklem 
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would narrow protection, however, Richards would broaden 
it.  Richards has argued that the moral basis of the free 
exercise clause is “a negative liberty immunizing from 
state coercion the exercise of the conceptions of a life 
well and ethically lived and expressive of a mature 
person’s rational and reasonable powers.”353  His broadly 
libertarian account entails that “the right to conscience 
protects the sphere of action when state intervention 
therein is not justified by the protection of all-purpose 
goods.”354  For Richards, conscientious objections to law 
need not be based on morality or religion; it is enough 
that they arise out of the agent’s exercise of his 
practical reason.  This, he acknowledges, entails 
constitutional protection for “everything and anything.”355   
The concerns that motivate Richards’s philosophy are 
rooted in his own experience as a young gay man in the 
1960s and 1970s, when he took major professional risks in 
order to be forthright and truthful about his sexuality.  
He was an early and courageous defender of gay rights at a 
time when most gay academics were deeply closeted and 
terrified of writing about these issues.356  The right to 
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conscience, he argues, protects “our moral autonomy in 
acknowledging the ethical principles that both define 
personal integrity and give shape indissolubly to the unity 
of belief and action that is one’s life.”357   It is hard to 
see whose claims would be excluded by this principle:  gay 
men who are less earnest and serious than Richards?  The 
unserious gay man is also exercising his rational and 
reasonable powers.  Richards himself is driven by concerns 
of a moral depth that his principle fails to capture.358 
The problem with any claim that purports to insulate 
all human conduct from state interference is that a rule 
that nominally protects everything in fact protects 
nothing.  There are indeed plural values of great weight.  
Religion does not outweigh all other human concerns.  But 
there is no way to operationalize a rule that one must 
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protect all deeply valuable activities.  All one can do is 
enumerate and protect them one at a time.359 
The deepest objection to what I have proposed is 
Rawlsian.  “[O]ur exercise of political power is fully 
proper,” Rawls argues, “only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason.”360   The basic idea of political 
liberalism, as noted earlier, is that people with different 
comprehensive conceptions of the good can and should reach 
an “overlapping consensus” on the principles of political 
cooperation.  They may disagree about the ultimate 
foundations of the political principles that govern them, 
but they agree upon the principles, those principles are 
moral ones, and they are affirmed on moral grounds.361 
 A common ground strategy entails endless political 
struggle.  The common ground is contingent and subject to 
continuing negotiation.  The upshot is a messier liberal 
theory than the kind attempted by, for example, Rawls.  A 
common ground strategy is, from Rawls’s point of view, 
costly, because it gives up on the idea of universal civic 
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friendship.  That is the deepest problem with the 
corruption argument:  it necessarily depends on a 
contestable conception of the good – in my formulation, the 
value of religion, understood very abstractly - and so can 
have no persuasive power to those who do not see any value 
in the good that the corruption claim seeks to protect.  On 
this basis, Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls’s most prominent 
followers and expositors, concludes that public reason 
excludes all comprehensive conceptions from public and even 
private deliberations about coercive laws.  This is why 
“[a]ppeals to Christian doctrine simply do not count as 
good public reasons in our political culture.”362  The same 
can equally be said of all appeals to the idea that 
religion as such is a good to be promoted. 
The Rawlsian objection to the claim about the good of 
religion that I have formulated here is that some people 
reasonably reject it, and that it therefore is not an 
appropriate basis for the exercise of political power.  The 
idea that the search for meaning in life is good, Martha 
Nussbaum writes, “is just a bit too dogmatic.  We live in a 
country in which many people are skeptics, doubting that 
there is such a thing as the ultimate meaning of life, and 
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where many others have dogmatic anti-meaning views.  For 
government to declare what Koppelman declares goes just a 
bit too far for such skeptical and/or anti-metaphysical 
views.”363  A regime that treats religion as a good is 
illegitimate for the same reason as a regime that treats 
Christianity as a good.  It is not a regime “the essentials 
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.” 
Since the corruption argument favors religion only by 
keeping the state away from it, it does not bias the basic 
structure in the ways that concern Rawls.  No one’s life 
chances are adversely affected by their holding any 
particular religious views.  The favoring of religion by 
the corruption argument is in no way inconsistent with 
freedom of conscience.  On the contrary, it is one path to 
such freedom. 
A Rawlsian might still object to the favoring of 
religion by rules that disable government from deciding 
religious questions, in the way that the rules described at 
the beginning of this paper do, because these rules make a 
contestable idea of the good into part of the basic 
structure.  The objection is related to Rawls’s conception 
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of distributive justice.  If government is going to be 
concerned with distributive justice at all, then it needs 
to know what it is distributing.  One of the distinguishing 
marks of a liberal political theory is that it will decline 
to specify those goods too precisely:  there are good 
reasons for keeping “salvation by Christ” off the list.   
Rawls sought to base his own theory of distributive 
justice on a thin theory of the good, because he did not 
want government deciding any issue of deep value.  In his 
final formulation, the primary goods that are the objects 
of distributive justice are citizens’ needs understood from 
a political point of view.  According to the political 
conception, every person has higher-order interests in 
developing and exercising his moral powers to develop a 
sense of justice and a conception of the good.  Justice 
requires “conditions securing for those powers their 
adequate development and full exercise.”364  The primary 
goods are “essential all-purpose means to realize the 
higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral 
powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so 
far as the restrictions on information permit the parties 
to know this).”365  Obviously religion cannot be a primary 
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good in this sense; one can exercise one’s moral powers 
without religion.  The mere fact that most people value 
something highly does not make it a primary good.366 
But the thin theory of the good that Rawls lays out is 
too parsimonious a basis for human rights.  Aspects of the 
person that are not involved in the exercise of the moral 
powers may nonetheless be very important.  For example, 
Rawls lacks the resources to condemn female genital 
mutilation, which does not deprive its victims of their 
moral powers or their normal capacities for cooperation.  
FGM hurts them in other ways.367  If a fuller conception of 
the person and the person’s needs are needed than Rawls 
offers, then Rawls is poorly positioned to object to the 
inclusion of religious concerns in that catalog of needs.368 
Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the 
only reliable path to social unity.  In modern societies, 
there is so much normative pluralism that the only 
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overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful 
relations is that constructed without any reference to the 
actual normative views of members of society.  That is why 
“partially comprehensive” views must be excluded.  
Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so 
that it “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or 
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive] 
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”369  “[T]he 
political conception of justice is worked out first as a 
freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without 
looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the 
existing comprehensive doctrines.”370  This approach may 
possibly work under certain circumstances, but they are 
likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is 
safe to drive a car while blindfolded. 
T.M. Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying 
and finding common ground among actual comprehensive views 
would not be satisfactory to Rawls.  “It would be 
impossible to survey all possible comprehensive views and 
inadequate, in an argument for stability, to consider just 
those that are represented in a given society at a given 
time since others may emerge at any time and gain 
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adherents.”371  On the other hand, as the persistence of the 
corruption argument over the past 350 years shows, a 
consensus built around the convergence of a contingent set 
of actual views may last for quite some time. 
 
VII.  Understanding the Rules 
 
 Return to the Establishment Clause rules that we had 
trouble explaining at the outset:  no endorsement of 
religion; no discrimination against particular religious 
practices; laws must have secular purposes; courts will not 
resolve controversies over religious doctrine.  They are 
not well tailored to prevent division or alienation.  How 
will these be appreciably worsened if, say, a court awards 
property to a claimant after a showing that the opposing 
party has departed from church doctrine?372  If the purpose 
of the Establishment Clause is to prevent corruption of 
religion, on the other hand, all of these rules make sense.  
The central evil is actions of the government that are 
intended to manipulate the religious beliefs of the 
citizens.  That’s why the state can’t engage in speech 
endorsing religious propositions, employ religious tests, 
                                                 
371 T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls 164 (Samuel Freeman, ed., 2003).   
372 See Presbyterian Church. 
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or enact laws which are tantamount to endorsement of 
religious propositions because they have no secular 
purpose.  Discrimination among religions is likewise an 
effort to interfere in the development of religious 
doctrine.  An obvious corollary is the state’s incompetence 
to resolve controversies over religious doctrine.  “[T]he 
government may not displace the free religious choices of 
its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular 
religious belief, tenet, or sect.”373 
 An obvious implication of the corruption argument is 
that the state may not declare religious truth.374  All of 
the religious practices that the authors considered here 
objected to had this as a common element.  To review:  
Milton opposed the censorship of heresy and the payment of 
clergy by the Crown.  Roger Williams objected to similar 
practices in colonial Massachusetts.  Locke opposed the 
repression of religious dissenters.  Pufendorf wrote 
against Louis XIV’s repression of Protestantism.  Elisha 
Williams opposed a law banning ministers from preaching 
                                                 
373 Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 733 
(1976)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Tribe observes that all nine of the 
justices in this case agreed with this proposition.  Tribe, supra note 
23, at 1240. 
374 I set this premise forth as axiomatic in Secular Purpose, supra note 
6.  Some writers have observed that this premise was inadequately 
defended in that article.  Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exericse 
and Nonestablishment Norms Forbid?  Reflections on the Constitutional 
Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 549, 570-72 (2003); 
Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625, 634-
36 (2003).  The present article is, in part, a response. 
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outside their parishes.  Backus and Leland fought religious 
taxes and the jailing of unlicensed preachers.  Jefferson 
opposed religious coercion and taxation.  Madison opposed 
nonpreferential support for churches. 
 Official declarations of religious truth raise 
recurring, core concerns of the corruption argument:  that 
the state will manipulate religion to serve its own, 
decidedly nonreligious ends; that citizens will be induced 
to profess the state’s religious line in order to curry 
official favor; that the state will meddle in matters of 
great importance, with respect to which it is incompetent 
and untrustworthy. 
 The core Establishment Clause violation, from the 
perspective of the corruption argument, is action by the 
state that intentionally manipulates religion to serve 
official ends.  Actions that have the incidental and 
unintended effect of advancing or inhibiting particular 
religious ideas present more ambiguous cases, and so it is 
harder to say what the corruption argument implies about 
them.  It happens that the boundary that separates clear 
from contested issues in Establishment Clause doctrine runs 
along precisely these lines.  We have already reviewed the 
areas of clarity.  Now consider the field of uncertainty. 
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 Three questions dominate contemporary religion clause 
scholarship. First, should religiously based exemptions 
from generally applicable laws be determined by the courts 
or the legislatures?375 Second, is it appropriate for 
citizens to seek to enact laws based on their religious 
beliefs?376 And third, may government directly fund 
                                                 
375 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 39; Nussbaum, supra note 38; Marci 
Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel:  Religion and the Rule of Law (2005); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 
61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1304–06 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An 
Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why 
Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75 
(1990); The James R. Browning Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Douglas Laycock, Religious 
Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313, 347–48 (1996); Ira C. 
Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 565 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of 
Kiryas Joel, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 104 (1996); William P. Marshall, The 
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 357 (1989–90); William P. Marshall, In Defense of 
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991); 
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 115 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 473 (1996); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: 
Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion 
and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195 (1992); Symposium: 
Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 597 
(1998); Symposium, Religion in Public Life: Access, Accommodation, and 
Accountability, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 599 (1992); Symposium, State and 
Federal Religious Liberty Legislation: Is It Necessary? Is It 
Constitutional? Is It Good Policy?, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 415 (1999); Mark 
Tushnet, “Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland 
Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 373; Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free 
Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 117. 
376 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Under God?  Religious Faith and Liberal 
Democracy (2003); Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of 
Citizenship (2002); Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in 
Liberal Politics (2002); Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular 
Reason (2000); Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (Paul J. Weithman 
ed., 1997); Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics: Constitutional and 
Moral Perspectives (1997); Robert Audi and Nicholas Woltersdorff, 
Religion in the Public Square:  The Place of Religious Convictions in 
Political Debate (1996); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and 
Public Reasons (1995); Rawls, supra note 360; Stephen L. Carter, The 
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religious activity, so long as the principle that 
determines who gets the funding is not itself religious?377 
 With respect to the first question, almost everyone 
agrees that exemptions, such as excusing Quakers from 
military service, are permissible.  The hard and hotly 
disputed question is whether those exemptions should be 
made by the legislature or the judiciary.  That is a 
question of comparative institutional competence, and the 
corruption argument says nothing about it.  The corruption 
argument, as we have noted, presupposes that religion is in 
some way a good thing.  That presupposition offers the way 
out of the free exercise/establishment dilemma.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize 
Religious Devotion (1993); Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role 
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Religiously Based Morality: Its Proper Place in American Law and Public 
Policy?, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 217 (2001); Symposium: The Role of 
Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 
643 (1993); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 2061 (1992) (book review). 
377 See, e.g., Commentary: On School Vouchers and the Establishment 
Clause, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 803 (1999); Steven K. Green, Private School 
Vouchers and the Confusion Over “Direct” Aid, 10 Geo. Mason U. Civ. 
Rts. L.J. 47 (1999/2000); Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Case 
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Faith-Based Schools and Tax-Funded Tuition: A GI Bill for Kids, 10 Geo. 
Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 83 (1999/2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, 
Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 
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corruption argument is thus not inconsistent with religious 
accommodation, which rests on the same premise. 
The concern about religious accommodation that the 
corruption argument highlights is that accommodation can 
sometimes be an occasion of hypocrisy.  From its earliest 
formulations, the corruption argument has rested on the 
premise that only genuinely felt religious activity has 
value; a persistent objection to Establishment has been 
that it produces feigned and therefore worthless religion.  
Exemptions can produce such hypocrisy.  But this is a 
reason for being selective in making accommodations 
available, so that they are given more stingily when they 
involve some substantial secular benefit.  It is not a 
reason to reject exemptions as such. 
 As for the second question, the corruption argument is 
not, in any way, an argument that it is inappropriate for 
citizens to vote based on their religious beliefs.  Its 
concern is that the coercive power of the state will be 
deployed to manipulate the religious beliefs of the 
citizens, not that the citizens’ political behavior will be 
influenced by their own beliefs.  It comes into play only 
when the state enacts a law that lacks a secular purpose 
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and so is tantamount to an official declaration of 
religious truth.378 
 Finally, there is the question of funding for 
religious activity.  Here it matters crucially whether the 
state is making a religious determination when it provides 
the support.  If it is making such a determination, then it 
is violating the core prohibition of declaration of 
religious truth, and concerns about corruption come to the 
fore.  If it is not, then the issue is, as with the 
exemption question, whether incentives for hypocrisy and 
pressure on religious minorities is being created.379  That 
is a question of fact, and so the corruption argument has 
no clear implications about the question. 
 What about ceremonial deism?  Questions of religious 
doctrine are in fact directly addressed by the placement of 
“In God We Trust” on currency, or “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance.  The Court has sometimes claimed that these 
practices are not really religious, but that is a silly 
                                                 
378 See generally Koppelman, supra note 6. 
379 Here I am basically in agreement with the analysis offered in 
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 198-239.  The gap in their 
analysis, one on which they do not dwell, is that no constitutional 
issue is raised if pressure is placed on other ideological minorities, 
such as racists.  Their argument implicitly singles out religion for 
special treatment without admitting that that is what it is doing.  See 
Koppelman, supra note 45. 
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argument, since they are overtly and conspicuously 
religious.380   
The general rule now seems to be that old forms of 
deism are grandfathered, but newer ones are 
unconstitutional.  As noted earlier, Justice Breyer, in the 
recent Ten Commandments cases, invalidated a recent display 
while upholding an older one.  Justice O’Connor, in her 
concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case,381 explicitly 
made the age of a ceremonial acknowledgement relevant to 
its constitutionality.  She thought that constitutionality 
was supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the 
absence of reference to a particular religion, and minimal 
religious content.  But the first of her factors was 
“history and ubiquity.”  “The constitutional value of 
ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its 
legitimate nonreligious purposes,” O’Connor wrote.  “That 
sort of understanding can exist only when a given practice 
has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation's 
history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it 
can fairly be called ubiquitous.”382  The consequence is to 
make old and familiar forms of ceremonial deism 
constitutional, but to discourage innovation.   
                                                 
380 This is elegantly argued by Gedicks, supra note 15, at 62-80. 
381 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 
(2004)(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).   
382 Id. at 37. 
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There are two aspects of this area of the law that 
distinguish it. 
 The first is that it represented a common ground 
strategy - an effort, in its own time, to understand 
“religion” in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way.  At the 
time that these elements of civil religion were put in 
place, the existence of God appeared to be the one aspect 
of religion that was common to the various religious 
factions then dominant in American life.  This was true of 
the vague deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence 
and the speeches of the Presidents, beginning with 
Washington; it was also true of the idea of a “Judeo-
Christian” ethic that was invented in the 1950s.383  This 
old settlement is part of the background in which 
contemporary American religion has developed.  Its 
continuation is not an effort by an incumbent 
administration to manipulate religion.  It simply 
recognizes that people are invested, in some cases very 
deeply, in the status quo.384 
 Of course, ceremonial deism has an effect on religion.  
It produces a culture in which many people feel that their 
                                                 
383 See Silk, supra note 215, at 40-53; Feldman, supra note 15, at 164-
70.  Nonsectarian Bible reading was a less attractive and less 
successful variant, since it quickly became inflected with anti-
Catholicism.  See Feldman, supra note 15, at 61-92, 108-110. 
384 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1227 (2003). 
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religious beliefs are somehow associated with patriotism.  
This has the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and 
common moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism.  It 
also has the less attractive effect of encouraging self-
righteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the United 
States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely 
sanctioned.385  What matters for present purposes is that 
neither of these effects is specifically aimed at by 
government when it perpetuates these rituals.  Political 
manipulation, in that sense, is not occurring.  Some 
writers have argued that government should aim to minimize 
its effect on religion, but that goal is not a coherent 
one:  any government actions at all will cause religion to 
be different from what it otherwise would have been.386 
 Today, on the other hand, the invocation of theism, 
and specifically the erection of a Ten Commandments 
display, is an intervention in the bitterest religious 
controversies that now divide us.387  Douglas Laycock thinks 
that a lesson of O’Connor’s opinion is that “separationist 
                                                 
385 See Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the 
American Constitution, in How Does the Constitution Protect Religious 
Freedom? 141 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds. 1987).  For recent 
examples of the latter unattractive effect, see Andrew Koppelman, 
Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 Dissent 64 (Spring, 2006).   
386 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 451-56; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
26, at 27-28.  This is why the corruption argument has so much more 
bite when government tries to affect religion as such than when it 
engages in facially neutral action that has a religious impact, such as 
providing education vouchers that can be used at religious schools. 
387 See Gedicks and Hendrix, supra note 276, at 275.   
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groups should sue immediately when they encounter any 
religious practice newly sponsored by the government.”388  
That is precisely the right lesson for them to take.  New 
sponsorship of religious practices is far more likely to 
represent a contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live 
religious controversy than the perpetuation of old forms.389 
 There is one more aspect of the corruption argument 
that needs to be considered.  This may be the most 
paradoxical aspect of all:  the argument, even if it plays 
a powerful role in Establishment Clause theory, cannot be 
directly relied upon to decide cases.  If a court tries to 
decide whether corruption has occurred in any particular 
case, it must first decide what a non-corrupted religion 
looks like.  And that will itself violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
Justice Souter, the principal modern proponent of the 
corruption rationale, has fallen squarely into this trap.390  
                                                 
388 Laycock, supra note 15, at 232.   
389 For a similar conclusion, see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 
147. 
390 Hugo Black, who made even more frequent use of the corruption 
argument, never did.  See supra notes 216-237 and accompanying text. 
 Black’s influence on Souter is sometimes direct, as when Souter 
quoted with approval Black’s declaration that the framers thought “that 
individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government 
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to 
assist any or all religions.”  Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2588 (2007)(Souter, J., dissenting), 
quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). 
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Dissenting in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,391 in which the 
Court upheld a program that allowed parents to pay 
religious school tuition with state-funded vouchers, he 
cited the risk of corruption described by Madison.  Then he 
declared:  “The risk is already being realized.”392  He 
noted the decisions of many religious schools to comply 
with the Ohio program’s requirements that schools not 
discriminate on the basis of religion, nor “teach hatred of 
any person or group on the basis of ... religion.” 
 Kevin Pybas observes that Justice Souter’s argument 
amounts to “an accusation that the religious have been 
unfaithful to their God and to what their God requires of 
them.”393  Pybas is entirely correct to belabor Souter with 
the familiar concern about the limits of state competence:  
“how does Justice Souter know when a particular religious 
community has compromised its principles?  Is he or the 
Court generally so well-versed in the theologies of the 
various religious traditions in this country that he or it 
is in a position to say to a religious community that it 
has violated its own principles?”394 
                                                 
391 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002)(Souter, J., dissenting). 
392 Id. at 712. 
393 Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion to be 
Confined to the Private Sphere?, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 71, 102 (2005). 
394 Id. at 101-102. 
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 Souter’s error shows that, even if the corruption 
rationale is accepted, it cannot be operationalized as a 
requirement that courts look for corruption in particular 
cases.  It is rather a reason for the state to avoid making 
any religious determinations at all.395 
 Souter offers a more telling objection to the voucher 
program’s restrictions when he observes that the ban on 
teaching “hatred” itself raises religious questions.  This 
condition, he notes, “could be understood (or subsequently 
broadened) to prohibit religions from teaching 
traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error, 
sinfulness, or ignorance of others.”396  Any such 
understanding might violate the hands-off rule, for the 
same reason that it was violated by the charge of fraud 
against Edna and Donald Ballard for claiming that St. 
Germain had given them extraordinary healing powers.397  
Claiming that the Christian religion is the only path to 
salvation and that all nonChristians are damned may or may 
not constitute “hatred.”  It is not clear how a state can 
decide that without getting into forbidden questions of 
                                                 
395 The point here is analogous to one that Richard Garnett has made 
about the rule, sometimes entertained by the Court, that a law may be 
unconstitutional because it has the potential to divide the populace 
along religious lines.  Garnett shows that divisiveness cannot provide 
a workable criterion for constitutionality.  He does not, however, deny 
that religious division is one of the underlying concerns of the 
establishment clause.  See Garnett, supra note 20, at 1667. 
396 536 U.S. at 713. 
397 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
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theology.  For example, a religious group might argue that 
its claims about the damnation of nonbelievers reflects 
loving concern rather than hatred.  How could a state 
respond to that? 
This objection is not fatal to the program, however, 
since the “hatred” proviso does not unambiguously require 
this result.  A familiar canon of statutory construction 
holds that ambiguous laws are not to be read in a way that 
renders them unconstitutional.398  Federal courts are also 
not to adjudicate the constitutionality of ambiguous state 
laws before the state courts have the opportunity to 
interpret them.399  For the same reason that a court can’t 
decide whether the Ballards’s religious claim is 
fraudulent, it can’t decide whether such a claim is 
hateful.  If Ohio were to read its hatred proviso in the 
way Souter suggests, that would raise constitutional 
difficulties.  It hasn’t happened yet, however, so it can’t 




                                                 
398 See 2A Singer & Singer, supra note 1, § 45:11 at 81-84. 
399 Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
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The corruption argument was once the basis for a 
political consensus among people with radically differing 
religious views.  They agreed that religion was valuable, 
and that it was likely to be damaged by state efforts to 
manipulate it.  The same understanding underlies much of 
modern Establishment Clause doctrine.  When the Court 
invalidated a prayer that New York State had composed for 
public school classrooms, it declared that “[i]t is neither 
sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate 
government in this country should stay out of the business 
of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that 
purely religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look to for religious 
guidance.”400  This vision of the Establishment Clause is 
worth reviving.   
Citizens do need to share an understanding of what is 
valuable.  But when the details of this particular Valuable 
Something are so hotly disputed, the most effective way for 
government to pay it reverence is just to shut up about it. 
 
 
                                                 
400 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). 
